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COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
Veronica Root†
In today’s regulatory environment, a corporation engaged
in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to
an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental
actors—from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department—
place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of
authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the SEC adjudicates claims of misconduct under the securities laws, and the Federal Trade
Commission deals with concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior. This segmentation of enforcement authority has created an information and coordination problem amongst
regulators, resulting in an enforcement regime where institutional misconduct is adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion. Enforcement actions focus on compliance with a particular set of
laws instead of on whether the corporate wrongdoing is a
result of a systematic compliance failure that requires a comprehensive, firm-wide, compliance overhaul. As a result, the
government’s goal of incentivizing companies to implement “effective ethics and compliance programs” appears at odds with
its current enforcement approach.
Yet governmental actors currently have the tools necessary to provide strong inducements for corporations to, when
needed, engage in restructuring of their compliance programs.
† © Veronica Root, Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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This Article argues that efforts to improve corporate compliance would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that
(i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. If governmental actors adopt a new enforcement strategy aimed at “Coordinating Compliance Incentives,” they can more easily detect
when an institution is suffering from a systemic compliance
failure, which may deter firms from engaging in recidivist behavior. If corporations are held responsible for being repeat
offenders across diverse regulatory areas, it may encourage
them to implement more robust reforms to their compliance
programs and, ultimately, lead to improved ethical conduct
and more effective compliance programs within public
companies.
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INTRODUCTION
Compliance is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and academics—are quick to tout its
power and potential for good. In 2015, the Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Enforcement Division stated, “strong legal and compliance functions are critical
elements of any successful enterprise, particularly those operating in the securities industry. . . . When legal and compliance
departments are not treated as full partners in the business,
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regulatory problems are inevitable.”1 In 2014, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Criminal Division explained that the work of compliance officials
“serves to protect the integrity of our public markets, the country’s financial systems, our intellectual property, the retirement accounts of our hardworking citizens, and our taxpayer
dollars.”2 In 2012, “36 percent of organizations sentenced had
a judge order” the adoption of a compliance program, compared
to only 6 percent in 2008.3 And these strong signals, and
others like them, have led corporations to focus on strengthening their internal compliance programs.4 For example, in
2014, the President and CEO of Walmart Stores, in the midst of
weathering a stunning bribery scandal, discussed the company’s goal “to become the model of excellence in global compliance and ethics.”5 Additionally, the President and CEO of
Walmart International stated that “[a]s a global company, we
have responsibilities to the countries in which we operate. We
earn trust through our commitment to compliance.”6 These
are just a few of numerous examples that demonstrate an unabashed fidelity to compliance efforts within the current legal
and regulatory environment.
Yet corporate misconduct continues, and many corporations suffer from multiple compliance failures within relatively
short time periods. An example of an institution with repeated
1
Andrew Ceresney, Dir. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
SIFMA’s 2015 Anti-Money Laundering & Financial Crimes Conference (Feb. 25,
2015) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022515spchc.html [https://perma.cc/5L7X-4RWU]) (including a disclaimer that his remarks expressed his own view and did not reflect the views of the SEC or its staff).
2
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct.
1, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-as
sistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics
[https://perma.cc/KM8F-97XY]) [hereinafter Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and
Compliance].
3
BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 164 (2014).
4
See, e.g., MATT KELLY ET AL., DELOITTE , IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS
SURVEY 8 (2015) (“U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (plus a host of other enforcement
actions, consent decrees, and regulatory statements) clearly favor a strong, independent corporate compliance function. . . . The 2015 Compliance Trends Survey
report suggests that more and more organizations are moving in that
direction . . . .”).
5
Walmart Stores’ CEO Discusses F4Q 2014 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 20, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
walmart-stores-ceo-discusses-f4q-140113595.html [https://perma.cc/C3RD7PWA].
6
Q4 2014 WalMart Stores, Inc. Prerecorded Earnings Conference Call –
Final, FAIR DISCLOSURE WIRE, Feb. 20, 2014, GALE, Doc. No. A360716228.
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instances of misconduct is HSBC Group (HSBC), a large, multinational financial services company with around thirty-seven
million customers in seventy countries and territories.7 Each
year, for the past six years, a governmental body has determined that HSBC, through one of its subsidiaries, has engaged
in some type of regulatory or legal misconduct.
• In 2010, HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. (HSBC NA)
and the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve) entered
into a consent Cease and Desist Order requiring HSBC NA
to improve its firm-wide compliance risk-management
program with a specific emphasis on its anti-money laundering efforts.8
• Also in 2010, HSBC Securities (USA) settled charges
brought by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
for failing to adequately disclose the risks associated with
auction rate securities to customers.9
• In 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued HSBC NA for
violations of the securities laws in connection with private-label mortgage-backed securities purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during 2005-2007. In 2014,
HSBC settled these claims for $550 million.10
• In 2012, HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC Holdings) and HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC USA) entered into an agreement
with the DOJ and admitted to violating the U.S. Bank
Secrecy Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act.11 As part of
its settlement agreement with the DOJ, HSBC Holdings
and HSBC USA agreed to retain a corporate compliance
7
Structure and Network, HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network [https://perma.cc/FMC4-SQ2M] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
HSBC has four major business areas: Commercial Banking, Global Banking and
Markets, Global Private Banking, and Retail Banking and Wealth Management.
Id.
8
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20101007a.htm
[https://perma.cc/F7GP-35RG].
9
News Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines HSBC Securities (USA) $1.5 million, US
Bancorp $275,000 for Auction Rate Securities Violations (Apr. 22, 2010), http://
www.finra.org/newsroom/2010/finra-fines-hsbc-securities-usa-15-million-usbancorp-275000-auction-rate-securities [https://perma.cc/228E-BYL3].
10
News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with
HSBC (Sept, 12, 2014), http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFAAnnounces-Settlement-with-HSBC.aspx [https://perma.cc/G722-BMWX].
11
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank
USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit
$1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-antimoney-laundering-and-sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/X8CF-Y8WF].
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monitor for a five-year period.12 The U.S. Department of
the Treasury Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the U.S. Federal Reserve Board were also involved in investigating the HSBC entities’ unlawful activity.13 In
2015, the monitor indicated that while HSBC Holdings
has improved its compliance in some areas, its corporate
culture and compliance technology still do not meet the
requirements of the deferred prosecution agreement the
bank agreed to as part of a 2012 settlement.14
• Also in 2012, a United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations case study determined that HSBC
USA repeatedly failed to detect international money laundering, connections to terrorist financing, and violations
of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.15
• In 2013, HSBC USA, N.A. self-reported three apparent
violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations
to the Office of Foreign Asset Control and agreed to remit
$32,400 as part of its settlement with Office of Foreign
Asset Control.16
• Also in 2013, HSBC entered into an agreement with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve to settle allegations that it engaged in mortgage
foreclosure abuse.17

12
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 15–17, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012), ECF No. 3-2, http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/12/11/dpa-executed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3C3N-MEYR].
13
News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses
$500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012173.html [https://perma.cc/WAZ5-5GAJ]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 11, 2012) https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/enforcement/20121211b.htm [https://perma.cc/XL7L-BP7Z].
14
Letter from Loretta Lynch et al., U.S. Attorney, to the Hon. John Gleeson,
Justice for the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. at 2, United States v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 33.
15
S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE HISTORY 10
(2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=2a76c00f-7c3a-44c8-902e3d9b5dbd0083 [https://perma.cc/DSC7-XC4Y].
16
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations
of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, OFF. FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL: ENFORCEMENT INFO. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbc.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7NNLF28].
17
News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC and Federal
Reserve Reach Agreement with HSBC to Provide $249 Million in Payments and
Assistance (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2013/nr-ia-2013-13.html [https://perma.cc/Y6Y9-GMLG].
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• In 2014, HSBC entered into a settlement with the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission for charges related to manipulation of the foreign exchange market.18
• Also in 2014, HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) S.A. (HSBC
Suisse) settled charges related to its willfully providing
“unregistered broker-dealer and investment advisory services to U.S. clients” in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.19
• In 2015, HSBC Suisse was placed under investigation for
potentially assisting its clients with tax evasion in the
U.S., France, and other countries.20
• In 2016, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
assessed a $35 million penalty against HSBC Bank USA,
N.A. for violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act due to improper billing of customers for a creditmonitoring product marketed and sold by the bank and
its affiliate.21

Thus, HSBC is a complex organization that has repeatedly engaged in actions that violate statutory or regulatory requirements. HSBC has not, however, been labelled a repeat offender
or recidivist by any governmental or regulatory authorities. Importantly, HSBC’s history of compliance failures is neither remarkable nor unique.22 Many other corporate entities have
similarly long lists evidencing noncompliance with legal and

18
Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Five Banks to Pay over $1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of
Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/PressReleases/pr7056-14 [https://perma.cc/UQW8-DCP7].
19
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges HSBC’s Swiss
Private Banking Unit with Providing Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients (Nov. 25,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13705
43534789#.VQhOXkKprzI [https://perma.cc/H3E4-JV75].
20
John Letzing, HSBC Hit by Fresh Details of Tax Evasion Claims, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-hit-by-fresh-detailsof-tax-evasion-claims-1423482612 [https://perma.cc/CPC2-SZHG]; see also
Martha M. Hamilton et al., New Countries Seek HSBC Data and Undeclared Cash,
INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://
www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks/new-countries-seek-hsbc-data-and-undecla
red-cash [https://perma.cc/D3K4-D6BJ].
21
News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses $35
Million Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.; Orders Restitution to Customers
for Unfair Billing Practices (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-45.html [https://perma.cc/7QW8-D9
WT].
22
See, e.g., Corporate Rap Sheets, CORP. RES. PROJECT, http://corp-research.org/corporaterapsheets [https://perma.cc/6YYV-W8C4] (linking to dossiers on several companies’ compliance failures).
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regulatory requirements across a variety of legal areas.23 All
this leads to the question: Why has the government largely
failed to sanction corporate repeat offenders as recidivists?
Part I discusses the piecemeal origins of corporate compliance programs—various regulatory and statutory requirements, paired with the government’s enforcement structure, as
well as pressure from private parties. Part II systematically
looks at the treatment of corporations entering into repeated
settlement agreements over time through a case study of DOJ
Fraud enforcement actions. The case study demonstrates that
corporations that engage in misconduct that is similar in underlying purpose and behavior are not treated as repeat offenders when sanctioned by distinct governmental agents but are
treated as repeat offenders when before the same enforcement
authority on multiple occasions.
Part III suggests that information, coordination, and lack of
identified responsibility challenges may partially explain the
findings of the case study. It then puts forth the thesis of this
Article—efforts to improve incentives to create effective corporate compliance programs would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in
recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and
(ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders.
In short, governmental actors would benefit from more coordinated enforcement efforts aimed at sanctioning recidivist conduct, which in turn would increase incentives for private firms
to engage in systematic revisions to their compliance programs.
Part III then outlines a proposal for reform, which provides a
framework for detecting recidivist public corporations through
their current reporting obligations to the SEC and a structural
mechanism for coordinating governmental efforts to incentivize
private firms to implement more robust compliance programs.
Part IV discusses benefits of and objections to the Article’s
proposal and then addresses some unresolved concerns raised
by the case study and proposal.

23
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 3, at 166 (“It is not at all clear that prosecutors take corporate recidivism seriously. Some settlements reflect prior crimes,
but often they do not appear to do so. Companies with several environmental
convictions include BP, ExxonMobil (with four convictions since 2001), McWane
Inc., and a series of ocean shipping companies.”).
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I
A REGIME OF PIECEMEAL COMPLIANCE
A focus on compliance within corporations has increased
exponentially over the past two decades, and it appears poised
to continue to grow in importance.24 Regulators, prosecutors,
and industry insiders have all bought into the idea that establishing and maintaining an effective compliance program is key
to ensuring corporations adhere to increasingly complex legal
and regulatory requirements.25
As this Part will demonstrate, the origins of compliance
programs are a natural consequence of a number of circumstances. Statutory and regulatory mandates require firms
within certain industries to develop compliance programs. Additionally, prosecutors provide concrete incentives for private
firms to create effective compliance programs because a program’s existence can serve as a defense or mitigating factor to
actual or potential criminal prosecution. Moreover, incentives
created by governmental enforcement priorities encourage corporations to pressure their own private business partners to
adhere to certain compliance standards.
A. Piecemeal Statutory & Regulatory Dictates
Perhaps it is unsurprising that today’s compliance regime
has been undertaken in a piecemeal fashion when one considers the various statutory and regulatory dictates that have led
to many corporate compliance priorities. There is no formal
statute or regulation that requires firms to engage in comprehensive compliance efforts. Instead, there are specific statutory and regulatory admonishments that require firms within
certain industries to implement discrete compliance programs.
For example, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requires banks
to adopt an anti-money laundering program.26 Specifically, it
requires banks to (i) develop internal policies, procedures, and
24
See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2077 (2016) (“Over the past decade, compliance has
blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance department has emerged,
in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.”).
25
See, e.g., Ceresney, supra note 1 (“Today more than ever, given the vastly
increased financial regulatory structure, legal and compliance must be gatekeepers in ensuring conformance with the law.”).
26
See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-39,
2014) [hereinafter Miller, Economic Analysis] (citing Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(h)(1) (2012)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2533661.

R
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controls;27 (ii) designate a compliance officer to oversee the
bank’s efforts;28 (iii) provide training to employees on an ongoing basis in an effort to prevent money laundering;29 and
(iv) implement an independent audit function to test the effectiveness of the bank’s programs.30 Thus, in as early as the
1970s, actions were taken in an effort to mandate that private
firms engage in effective policing efforts; those efforts have continued to grow.31
In 2002, in response to the Enron and Arthur Andersen
scandals,32 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
was described by former President George W. Bush as “the
most far reaching reforms of American business practices since
the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”33 Sarbanes-Oxley
“mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate responsibility” as well as “enhance[d] financial disclosures and combat[ted] corporate and accounting fraud.”34 Specifically, it
emphasized the importance of “internal compliance and enhanced internal corporate controls [and] . . . effectively forced
corporate gatekeepers to ‘commit’ to corporate compliance.”35
As such, Sarbanes-Oxley and corresponding regulatory reforms increased the emphasis on compliance within private
firms. “More than a decade following the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, both ‘compliance’ and ‘risk management’ have
become key functions within public corporations.”36 Today, it
is very uncommon for regulators to encounter public companies that “do not have any compliance program.”37
27

See id. at 3–4.
See 12 C.F.R. § 326.8(c)(2) (2016) (clarifying the purpose of compliance
officers).
29
See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (explaining that the purpose of the statute is to
“guard against money laundering”).
30
See Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 4.
31
See Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 FLA.
L. REV. 87, 143 (2014).
32
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1,
16–18 (2014); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview 3 (N.Y.U.
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2527621 [hereinafter Miller,
Compliance Function].
33
The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#sox2002 [https://perma.cc/
4LPJ-WVVC] (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
34
Id.
35
Baer, supra note 31, at 141–42 (citing Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent
Management & the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 442 (2005)).
36
Id. at 143.
37
Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, supra note 2.
28

R

R
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More recently, in response to the financial crisis of 20072009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, which
included a requirement that regulators overseeing banks implement the “Volcker Rule.”38 The Volcker Rule regulations
prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading and restrict commercial banks and their affiliates from investing in
hedge funds and private equity firms.39 The regulations detail
the necessary “components of an effective compliance program”40 and require mid-sized banks to adhere to the “following six elements: written policies and procedures; a system of
internal controls; a management framework that clearly delineates responsibility and accountability for compliance; independent testing and audit of the effectiveness of the compliance
program; training for trading personnel and managers; and
making and keeping records sufficient to demonstrate compliance.”41 Additionally, the Volcker Rule requires that Chief Executive Officers (CEO) at companies subject to the rule “attest
that the company’s compliance program is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with [the rule.]”42
These are just a few of what are many different statutory or
regulatory frameworks that require corporations to engage in
specific compliance efforts.43 The manner in which these different requirements came into being makes sense intuitively.
As Congress or regulators encountered areas of corporate misconduct, they responded by requiring organizations to implement reforms targeted at improving policing within firms and
compliance with specific legal and regulatory mandates. As
these various requirements were enacted, private firms then
created or modified existing compliance programs, on a piecemeal basis, so that their programs would adhere to the regulatory changes.
38
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit Derivatives,
33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 822 (2014).
39
See 17 C.F.R. pt. 75 (2016); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808, 5810 (Jan. 31, 2014).
40
Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 6.
41
Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 13.
42
12 C.F.R. pt. 248, app. B.
43
See generally Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 3 (citing U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (noting
that effective compliance programs may deter prosecution or lower sanctions); see
also Baer, supra note 31, at 142 (discussing prosecution agreements and reduced
criminal sanctions).
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B. Diverse, Enforcement-Related Incentives
A number of enforcement-related policies and practices
have also resulted in changes to corporate compliance programs. Governmental actors adopt certain enforcement strategies in an effort to leverage companies’ strong interests in
avoiding sanctions for failing to comply with legal and regulatory requirements. The government is able to encourage private firms to engage in aggressive self-policing efforts by
providing leniency to corporations who, though engaged in
misconduct, nevertheless have “effective compliance programs,”44 and by ramping up sanctions for companies who
failed to ensure that their agents comply with the law.45
The framework empowering the government’s enforcement-related incentives comes primarily through the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Guidelines. Twenty-six
years ago, in 1991, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
promulgated, and, in a section entitled “Effective Compliance
and Ethics Program,” organizations were admonished to “exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct;
and . . . otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law.”46 The Organizational Guidelines, pursuant to
requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were revised in 2004
“to further define the meaning of an effective compliance and
ethics program.”47
Today, the Organizational Guidelines outline “seven key
criteria for establishing an ‘effective compliance program.’”48
• Oversight by high-level personnel;
• Due Care in delegating substantial
authority;

discretionary

44
In addition to these types of governmental frameworks, there are also selfregulatory organizations that are utilized to “implement rules that prevent” organizational misconduct. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41-42), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776731.
45
See Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, supra note 2 (discussing
that a corporation that engaged in “massive disregard for compliance,” was prosecuted, eventually pleaded guilty, and was ultimately required to pay a record $8.8
billion penalty).
46
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
1991).
47
Baer, supra note 31, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48
PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HF99-W8ZY] [hereinafter DESIO, OVERVIEW].

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt

1014

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

23-MAY-17

14:02

[Vol. 102:1003

• Effective Communication to all levels of employees;
• Reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include
systems for monitoring, auditing, and reporting suspected
wrongdoing without fear of reprisal;
• Consistent enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary mechanisms; and
• Reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further similar offenses upon detection of a violation.49

These guidelines, if followed, provide concrete suggestions for
corporations developing comprehensive compliance programs.
Because of the different business realities that individual corporations face, the guidelines provide broad-based requirements that businesses can implement in a manner that makes
the most sense for their particular business risks.
Since companies have different characteristics, history, and
cultures, any attempt to specify the ingredients of an effective
program at a granular level will likely generate poor results.
No regulator or prosecutor can hope to know more about the
internal workings of an organization than the existing managers who spend their professional lives there.50

Thus, the Organizational Guidelines as currently written are
generally considered a strong source of guidance for corporations interested in developing, on their own initiative, an effective compliance program.51
There is, however, a limitation within the overarching
framework of the Organizational Guidelines that encourages
piecemeal compliance: they are invoked formally only when a
prosecution is contemplated against a corporation engaged in
misconduct, and prosecutions are often focused on a narrow
aspect of misconduct. Prosecutors often “demand that targets
upgrade compliance programs as a condition to deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements,” and “[s]ettlements of
regulatory enforcement actions often include undertakings to
enhance compliance activities.”52 These enforcement-related
incentives, however, do not typically encourage corporations to
engage in comprehensive modifications to their compliance
programs; instead, the focus is on a particular aspect of a
49

Id.
Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 19.
51
See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 12 (noting that the
Sentencing Guidelines may have been “the earliest statement of the requirements
for a robust compliance program”). But see GARRETT, supra note 3, at 160 (noting
that because the guidelines “do not give meaningful credit for good corporate
conduct . . . law professor Jennifer Arlen has called the guidelines a ‘failure.’”).
52
Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 11.
50
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firm’s compliance program.53 Thus, while the compliance
framework contemplated in the guidelines is quite broad, the
actual enforcement mechanisms that lead to the invocation of
the goals within the Organizational Guidelines are often quite
narrow. Additionally, the Organizational Guidelines often
serve in a purely advisory capacity, as they technically do not
govern or restrict behavior associated with civil enforcement
actions.54
For example, the Fraud Section at the DOJ (DOJ Fraud) is
responsible for bringing prosecutions against corporations for
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).55 In the
past decade, DOJ Fraud has employed a relatively aggressive
enforcement strategy aimed at discouraging improper payments to foreign officials.56 Many potential FCPA prosecutions,
however, result in civil settlement agreements in the form of
deferred or non-prosecution agreements, thereby making the
Organizational Guidelines technically inapplicable. These civil
settlement agreements often include a provision discussing the
corporation’s compliance program, but the discussion is often
focused on the corporation’s compliance with a specific legal
area. For instance, in a deferred prosecution agreement between DOJ Fraud and Biomet, Inc. (Biomet), the company
agreed to “continue to implement and maintain a compliance
and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of
the FCPA and other applicable anticorruption laws throughout
its operations, including those of its affiliates, joint ventures,
contractors, and subcontractors, with responsibilities that include interactions with foreign officials or other high-risk activities.”57 Thus, the enforcement action included the
admonishments contained in the Organizational Guidelines,
but it did so in a narrow manner that focused solely on ensuring that Biomet employed a compliance and ethics program
53
See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 13, United States v. ABB, Inc., No. H-10-664
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (requiring ABB to “implement a compliance
and ethics program designed to . . . prevent violations of the FCPA, U.S. commercial bribery laws, and all applicable foreign bribery laws”).
54
See DESIO, OVERVIEW, supra note 48 (explaining that the organizational
sentencing guidelines apply when organizations engage in criminal conduct).
55
See CRIM. DIV. U.S. DEP’T JUST. & ENFORCEMENT DIV. U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4
(2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
56
See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV.
523, 540 (2014) [hereinafter Root, Monitor-“Client”]; F. Joseph Warin et al., Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 321, 347–48 (2011).
57
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No.
1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1.
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that was designed to ensure that another FCPA or similar violation would not occur.
C. Pressure from Private Parties
In addition to direct governmental mandates and enforcement-related incentives to employ certain compliance programs, organizations must often find mechanisms to adopt
compliance reforms in order to engage in certain business relationships with other private parties.58 For example, Clorox has
instituted a “Business Partner Code of Conduct,” which explains that it expects “the practices of [its] partners to reflect
[Clorox’s] own.”59 The code details “business practice standards for [Clorox’s] direct suppliers of goods, service providers,
consultants, distributors, licensees, joint ventures, contractors
and temporary workers.”60 Clorox’s code provides general guidance on the importance of adhering to human rights requirements, safe working conditions, environmental regulations,
and compliance with fair business practices and applicable
laws.61 It then provides information on how to make inquiries
regarding appropriate compliance with the code and then goes
on to detail sanctions that could be levied against business
partners for violating Clorox’s code.62 Specifically, the code
states:
We may pursue legal or other sanctions against any business
partners who violate the Code or applicable laws when conducting Clorox business. We may also immediately terminate the business relationship, and any related contracts, to
the extent permitted by applicable laws. We may also choose,
in our sole discretion, to enter into a remediation plan with
non-compliant business partners, in which the business
partner agrees to take corrective action to fix the business
misconduct within a defined period of time.63

Similarly, Oracle has a “Partner Code of Conduct and Business Ethics,” which is applicable to Oracle Partners, “resellers,
and to all personnel employed by or engaged to provide services

58
See Scott Killingsworth, The Privatization of Compliance, in TRANSFORMING
COMPLIANCE 33, 33 (RAND Corp., 2014).
59
THE CLOROX CO., BUSINESS PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2013).
60
Id.
61
See id. at 4, 9–13.
62
Id. at 6–7.
63
Id. at 7.
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to [the Oracle Partner] throughout the world.”64 Oracle’s code
explicitly requires a heightened standard of conduct by its business partners, stating “[w]here local laws are less restrictive
than this Code, [the Oracle Partner] must comply with the
Code, even if [the Oracle Partner’s] conduct would otherwise be
legal.”65 The Oracle code is primarily concerned with activities
that might violate requirements under the FCPA and similar
laws, antitrust and competition laws, intellectual property
rights, securities laws, and export control laws.66 Oracle’s code
also details mechanisms for reporting violations of the code.67
It concludes by explaining that “[a]ny violation of this Code will
constitute the basis for the immediate termination of [the Oracle Partner’s] distribution agreements with Oracle and the cancellation of any pending fees payable to [the Oracle Partner],
pursuant to applicable laws and without any liability to
Oracle.”68
This type of private pressure for the adoption of compliance
programs is necessary because companies are “increasingly
accountable not only for their own compliance” but also that of
their business partners, which motivates corporations to obtain contractual assurances that business partners are engaged in acceptable compliance practices.69 Additionally, in
some arenas, a “prerequisite for conventional access to capital”
is the utilization of a system of compliance risk management.70
Indeed, “corporate credit agreements and securities underwriting agreements commonly include additional representations
and covenants that the borrower/issuer has ‘implemented and
maintains policies and procedures designed to ensure, and

64
ORACLE, PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT AND BUSINESS ETHICS 2, http://
www.oracle.com/partners/en/how-to-do-business/opn-agreements-and-policies/019520.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R53-RWUA].
65
Id.
66
See id. at 3–6.
67
See id. at 7–8.
68
Id. at 8.
69
Killingsworth, supra note 58, at 33.
70
Id. at 38. The government has made its preference for private parties to
demand specific compliance requirements from their partners explicit in recent
statements from senior government officials. See, e.g., Stephen Dockery, U.S.
Justice Department Outlines Metrics for New Compliance Expert, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
2, 2015, 11:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/02/u-sjustice-department-outlines-metrics-for-new-compliance-expert/ [https://
perma.cc/2YSX-UUSS] (explaining that metrics for determining when to charge a
company criminally will include whether third parties are informed of compliance
expectations).
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which are reasonably expected to continue to ensure, compliance’ with specified laws.”71
Thus, the ad hoc system by which many private firms have
instituted their compliance programs is motivated not only by
governmental actors but also by private parties that have a
sufficient amount of influence to encourage their business
partners to adopt specific reforms as a condition of the business relationship.
***
Corporations today confront demands from a variety of
sources to implement compliance programs that meet very specific requirements. Whether the pressure comes from a statute, regulation, prosecutor, or business partner, corporations
that want to remain competitive must satisfy a number of different compliance priorities.72 And while the Organizational
Guidelines provide a potentially strong incentive to encourage
companies to employ comprehensive compliance programs, the
impetus for developing or revamping compliance programs is
often communicated to firms on an ad hoc basis that is tied to
ensuring compliance with a specific area of the law.
Thus, it may be that corporations are being encouraged to
implement piecemeal compliance programs at the possible expense of more comprehensive compliance efforts. Indeed, because corporations are often responding to the threat of
sanction when engaging in reforms to their compliance programs, they may focus the majority of their efforts on areas
where the firm deems itself vulnerable to receiving a sanction.
The rationality of this approach becomes apparent when one
looks at corporate repeat offenders more closely.
II
CORPORATE REPEAT OFFENDERS: A CASE STUDY
Governmental actors—both regulators and prosecutors—
are often charged with evaluating the effectiveness of a corporation’s compliance program when misconduct is discovered
within a firm. This evaluation is necessary for determining an
appropriate sanction to be levied against the firm engaged in
misconduct.73 Yet, as shown in this Part, governmental actors
71

Killingsworth, supra note 58, at 38.
See id. at 33–34.
73
See DESIO, OVERVIEW, supra note 48 (explaining that the organizational
sentencing guidelines incorporate “the preventive and deterrent aspects of systematic compliance programs”).
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are often focused on discrete issues within firms’ compliance
programs, which allows firms to engage in multiple violations
of legal and regulatory requirements without governmental
consideration of whether firms should be treated as recidivists.
Given the variety of potential violations that can occur within a
firm and the number of governmental actors that investigate
and prosecute such violations, gatekeepers within firms may
have an incentive to prioritize complying with regulations on a
piecemeal basis instead of considering the effectiveness of the
firm’s compliance program from a more comprehensive
standpoint.
As this Part reveals, many corporate entities settling claims
of misconduct in one area of law go on to settle allegations of
corporate wrongdoing in another legal area. Using FCPA enforcement actions brought by DOJ Fraud as a starting point,
this Part demonstrates that firms are sometimes treated as
recidivists when they engage in multiple violations of a legal
requirement investigated by the same governmental enforcement agent but are not treated as recidivists when subsequent
violations of law are resolved with multiple governmental agencies or departments.
A. Methodology74
The past decade saw a renewed effort to ensure companies
adhere to the statutory requirements under the FCPA. As a
result, FCPA enforcement actions have increased exponentially
with high profile, governmental sanctions levied against companies in a variety of industries.75 To determine how the government may be treating corporate repeat offenders, I began by
identifying corporate entities that entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas settling FCPA violations with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to
2016.76 I then reviewed other agency enforcement actions’
74

See Appendices.
See FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html [https://perma.cc/7VVFWRJM] (last updated Jan. 12, 2017) (providing a list of linked cases to related
enforcement actions).
76
I chose 2004 as a starting point, because it is generally understood as the
time period that began robust FCPA enforcement by DOJ Fraud. See, e.g., Warin
et al., supra note 56, at 325 (stating that 2007 saw a large increase in enforcement
actions). One flaw that became apparent in this methodology is that companies in
industries where FCPA violations apparently are less common were not captured
in the research. For example, multinational bank HSBC has entered into several
well-publicized settlement agreements with the SEC, DOJ, OFAC and the U.S.
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) since 2012. See News Release, Fed.
75
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websites, including the DOJ Antitrust division,77 SEC,78 Federal Trade Commission,79 Federal Communications Commission (FCC),80 and Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign
Asset Control81 for unrelated settlement agreements with that
company. I also conducted internet searches using the name
of a company with at least one known FCPA violation and
searched for the terms “settlement,” “fraud,” and “false claims.”
Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with HSBC (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Settlementwith-HSBC.aspx [https://perma.cc/J97F-4MNX]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Settles Civil Fraud Claims
Against HSBC Bank for Failure to Monitor Fees Submitted for Foreclosure-Related Services (July 1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/
July14/HSBCSettlementPR.php [https://perma.cc/325X-JNFC]; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to
Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-andsanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/8GW4-S2KH]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges HSBC’s Swiss Private Banking Unit with Providing
Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543534789#.VQhOXkKprzI [https://
perma.cc/8KXD-HMVN]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for
Apparent Violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, OFF. OF FOREIGN
ASSET CONTROL: ENFORCEMENT INFO., (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbc.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C2N7-W9EQ]. However, since HSBC has not entered into a settlement
related to FCPA, its repeated violations are not reflected in this section of the
Article. A different data set could be created by using a different agency enforcement action’s database as the starting point rather than the FCPA or by searching
a regulatory news column such as the Wall Street Journal Risk and Compliance
Journal. Risk & Compliance Journal, WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/
news/risk-compliance-journal [https://perma.cc/5B9H-9ZBE].
77
Antitrust Case Filings, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/index.html#page=page-1 [https://perma.cc/KYG2-5P6U].
78
Administrative Proceedings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.shtml [https://perma.cc/8FKZ-R4TH] (last modified Mar. 10, 2017). A Google search of the company name and “SEC” or “SEC
settlement” may be more effective as this database is less searchable than other
databases.
79
Cases and Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/en
forcement/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/BR63-D86Q].
80
Enforcement Bureau, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/enforcement-bureau [https://perma.cc/FY5E-FB69] (last updated Mar. 3, 2017). A
Google search of the company name and “FCC,” “FCC violation” or “FCC settlement” may be more effective, as this database is not as easily searched.
81
Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.
aspx [https://perma.cc/BZ25-SRY2]. A Google search of the company name and
“OFAC,” “OFAC violation,” or “unauthorized export” may be more effective. See
also Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T COM.: BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, https://
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement [https://perma.cc/N8SU-JLY7]
(describing the Bureau of Industry and Security Export Enforcement’s mission).
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I found this to be the most effective way to find additional
violations, particularly for False Claims Act violations.82
B. High-Level Results
From 2004 to 2016, DOJ Fraud entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas with 159 separate companies.83 These separate companies, however, are often related entities. When the related entities are treated as one corporate entity, ninety-four separate
corporate entities are found to have entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty
pleas with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to 2016.84 Of these ninetyfour corporate entities, thirty-three involved a guilty plea to
settle an alleged FCPA violation.85 Of these thirty-three corporate entities that entered guilty pleas, one appeared twice due
to multiple FCPA violations a few years apart; therefore, because tracking the repeat offenses for each appearance would
result in double-counting, this effectively leaves thirty-two relevant corporate entities.86 I focused on these thirty-two corporate entities when attempting to identify repeat offenses
because if a company was required to enter into a guilty plea,
as opposed to being allowed to enter into a civil enforcement
action, it may signal more egregious or troubling misconduct.87
82
The DOJ Civil Division prosecutes False Claims Act violations but does not
appear to maintain an enforcement actions database, unlike other agencies. See,
e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Biomet Companies to Pay over $6 Million
to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Concerning Bone Growth Stimulators
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/biomet-companies-pay-over-6million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-concerning-bone [https://perma.cc/
4JS8-4VPR] [hereinafter 2014 Biomet Press Release] (providing an example of an
enforcement action under the False Claims Act).
83
See infra app. A. There was an element of judgment in compiling the list of
total companies entering into agreements because the identity of each corporation
was not reported in a uniform fashion. Sometimes each subsidiary entering into
an agreement with the DOJ was apparent in a press release, in other instances
the information was located within the body of the agreement, and in still other
examples the information was found in an appendix to the applicable agreement.
As a result, the more reliable and replicable number is the corporate entity
number.
84
The vast majority of these ninety-four entities were identified by utilizing
the “year” search function on the DOJ Fraud FCPA enforcement actions page.
There were three companies from 2011, however, that were not properly tagged as
occurring in that year. They were identified by going through the alphabetical list
of enforcement actions on the DOJ Fraud website.
85
See infra app. B.
86
See infra app. C, entries ##1 & 15.
87
See, e.g., RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 55, at 52–53 (describing the considerations of DOJ prosecutions, including the history of the corporation’s misconduct in other criminal, civil, or regulatory enforcement).
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Of the thirty-two corporate entities that entered into guilty
pleas to resolve alleged FCPA violations, twenty-two did not
engage in additional instances of misconduct within a five-year
period of the relevant FCPA offense.88 This yielded a data set89
of ten corporate entities that have settled multiple allegations
of FCPA violations or settled FCPA violations and settled
charges of unrelated, unlawful conduct under a different statute within a relatively short period (generally five years). The
case study analyzes these ten corporate entities in an effort to
glean insight regarding repeat misconduct by corporate
entities.
C. Multiple Offense Categories
Among the ten firms identified, similarities emerged where
the unrelated settlements concern violations: (i) with the same
or similar unlawful objectives and behavior, (ii) with the same
or similar unlawful behavior but dissimilar unlawful objectives,
and (iii) that do not share any characteristics in terms of the
type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose. Concerns regarding possible corporate recidivist conduct are most apparent for the first category of firms and look to be inapposite for
those in the third category.
1. Category 1: Same or Similar Unlawful Behavior and
Unlawful Purpose
The two corporate entities in this category—Hewlett-Packard and Marubeni—were involved in repeated violations that
shared the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful
purpose. Hewlett-Packard entered into settlement agreements
to resolve charges of bribery or improper payments under the
FCPA and entered settlements related to entirely separate instances of paying customer kickbacks, such as improper payments or other unlawful inducements in violation of the AntiKickbacks Act, the False Claims Act, and related fraud regulations. Marubeni entered into two settlement agreements to resolve charges of bribery under the FCPA without committing
violations of other regulatory or legal areas. This section discusses the Hewlett-Packard violations, as they demonstrate the
challenge with deterring similar misconduct when it falls under
diverse regulatory areas.
88
89

See infra app. C.
See infra app. C.
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Hewlett-Packard entered into three settlement agreements
from 2010 to 2014 to resolve different instances of improper
payments. Specifically, in August 2010, Hewlett-Packard
agreed to pay $55 million to settle charges that it “knowingly
paid kickbacks, or ‘influencer fees,’ to systems integrator companies in return for recommendations that federal agencies
purchase [Hewlett-Packard’s] products.”90 That settlement
agreement also covered allegations that Hewlett-Packard had
submitted defective pricing under government contracts.91
Then, in November 2010, Hewlett-Packard entered into a
$16.25 million agreement with the FCC to settle charges that it
had provided improper inducement and gratuities to school
officials in the Houston and Dallas Independent School Districts while it was also bidding on contracts to supply equipment to the school districts under the FCC E-Rate program.92
“Meals and entertainment—including trips on a yacht and tickets to the 2004 Super Bowl—were provided by the contractors
to get inside information and win contracts that were supposed
to be awarded through a competitive bidding process.”93 This
behavior violated the FCC’s competitive bidding rules.94 Finally, in 2014, Hewlett-Packard and its subsidiaries agreed for
the subsidiaries to plead guilty to bribery of Russian officials
and to pay more than $108 million to settle allegations that
subsidiaries in Russia, Poland, and Mexico made unlawful facilitating payments or paid bribes to public officials to win contracts, which violated the FCPA.95
90
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Agrees to Pay the
United States $55 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraud (Aug. 30, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-agrees-pay-united-states-55-millionsettle-allegations-fraud [https://perma.cc/8FFB-WNQX] [hereinafter HP Fraud
Press Release].
91
Id.
92
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Settles Lawsuits Against HewlettPackard and Intervenes Against Its Business Partners for Violating FCC Competitive Bidding Rules in Texas (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ussettles-lawsuits-against-hewlett-packard-and-intervenes-against-its-businesspartners [https://perma.cc/9LYQ-KK4X] [hereinafter HP Bid Rigging Press
Release].
93
Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, HP to Pay $16.25 million to Settle
DOJ-FCC E-Rate Fraud (Nov. 10, 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-302764A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5S2-X69P].
94
HP Bid Rigging Press Release, supra note 92.
95
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery [https://perma.cc/
3STH-ZQTM]. Hewlett-Packard, the parent company, did not enter into a plea
agreement with DOJ Fraud, but it did enter into a settlement with the SEC and
agreed to pay $31,472,250 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. Id.
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In each instance, employees gave unlawful payments or
gifts with the purpose of inducing the recipients to award Hewlett-Packard business opportunities. Hewlett-Packard was not,
however, treated as a recidivist in any of the plea or settlement
agreements. Indeed, in determining the appropriate fine for
Hewlett-Packard’s 2014 FCPA violation, the DOJ included two
mitigating factors to support the imposition of a fine that was
less than the minimum fine calculated under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, “the misconduct . . . was
largely undertaken by employees associated with [HewlettPackard’s Russian subsidiary], which employed a small fraction of [Hewlett-Packard’s] global workforce[,]” and “neither
[Hewlett-Packard] nor the [Russian subsidiary] ha[d] previously
been the subject of any criminal enforcement action by the
[DOJ] or law enforcement authority in Russia or elsewhere.”96
While it is true that Hewlett-Packard’s alleged E-Rate fraud and
alleged violation of the False Claims Act in 2010 were both civil
offenses, not criminal offenses, in all three instances HewlettPackard employees paid unlawful bribes or other inducements
to win contracts. The offenses fall under three different regulations—the False Claims Act, the FCC’s competitive bidding
rules, and the FCPA—and the 2010 and 2014 offenses were
prosecuted by different divisions of the DOJ—the Civil Division
in 2010 and the Criminal Division in 2014— yet there are clear
similarities in both the manner and goal of Hewlett-Packard’s
misconduct.
It may seem as if the examples of Hewlett-Packard and
Marubeni’s repeat misconduct, which are characterized as
having the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful
purpose, are flukes and not representative of a more concerning trend. As such, it is important to note that if the case study
were expanded to include companies entering into deferred or

96
Plea Agreement at 17, United States v. ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O., No.
5:14-cr-00201 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-zao/hp-russia-plea-agreement.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6LFP-ZA6H]. This factor was mentioned only in HP’s Russian subsidiary’s plea agreement. The settlement agreements covering the Polish and Mexican
subsidiaries do not contain any language to this effect. See Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v. Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O., No. 5:14-cr00202 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/hewlett-packard-polska/hp-poland-dpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFM5U59T]; Letter from Melinda Haag, United States Attorney et al. to F. Joseph Warin,
Counsel for Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://
fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/002202.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HD57-PW88].
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non-prosecution agreements with DOJ Fraud, other examples
similar to those of Hewlett-Packard become apparent.97
2. Category 2: Similarities in Unlawful Behavior but Not
Unlawful Purpose
The second category of repeat offenders contains two corporate entities that entered into settlement agreements regarding unlawful conduct where the goals of the conduct were
different between the two settlements, but the manner of behavior was similar. Specifically, ABB, Inc.98 and Bridgestone
97
For example, in 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $21.4 million as
part of a settlement agreement to resolve charges claiming that its subsidiaries
had violated the FCPA by making improper payments to government officials in
Greece, Poland, and Romania and paying kickbacks under the United Nations Oil
for Food Program. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson
Agrees to Pay $21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and Oil for Food Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay-214-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreigncorrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/SFJ6-XULH]. In 2013, Johnson &
Johnson entered into a $2.2 billion settlement agreement to resolve criminal and
civil charges of health care fraud, including paying kickbacks to physicians to
induce them to prescribe medications that had been unlawfully misbranded and
to pharmacies to encourage pharmacists to promote the use of Johnson & Johnson’s pharmaceuticals. These improper payments resulted in the submission of
false claims to federal health care programs, making Johnson & Johnson liable
under the False Claims Act. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson &
Johnson to Pay More than $2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more
-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/4C46RPEG]. In both cases, Johnson & Johnson employees made unlawful payments
to facilitate broader use of their products or to secure contracts. Yet the settlement agreements concerning the civil charges, including the charges of improper
payments and inducements, contain no consideration of Johnson & Johnson’s
previous violations. See id.
Biomet serves as yet another example of this type of repeat corporate misconduct. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Biomet, Inc., No.
1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1; Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and Biomet, Inc. at 1, United States v. Biomet
Orthopedics, Inc., No. 07-8133, 2007 WL 2964201 (D. N.J. Sept. 27, 2007), http:/
/www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/Older/BiometCivilSettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTZ9-MAAJ]; U.S. DEP’T JUST., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN OIG-HHS AND BIOMET, INC. 19, 31 (2007), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/BiometCIA92
707.pdf [https://perma.cc/YAL4-PXYL]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five
Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing
to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/hips0927.rel.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z6G3-YLVF]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Third Medical Device
Company Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-company-resolves-foreigncorrupt-practices-act-investigation [https://perma.cc/7YSS-2SE6].
98
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.
Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging on USAID Construction Contract in Egypt
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Corporation (Bridgestone)99 each entered into settlement
agreements related to FCPA violations and, separately, for engaging in anticompetitive behavior in violation of the Sherman
Act. The underlying unlawful behavior in these instances was
similar in that for both the FCPA and the antitrust violations
the firms were involved in conspiracies with other entities to
achieve unlawful objectives. However, the unlawful purpose
for the FCPA and antitrust violations differed. In the case of the
FCPA violations, the firms were attempting to obtain a competitive advantage over their competitors, but in the case of the
antitrust violations, the purpose of the conspiracy was to work
with competitors to protect profits through bid rigging, pricefixing, and agreeing not to compete for certain business.100
Interestingly, in separate enforcement actions, each corporate entity was treated as a recidivist for repeated violations
under the FCPA or antitrust regulations, but the recidivism
treatment only occurred when appearing before the same governmental actor on a second occasion.101 For example, when
Bridgestone pleaded guilty in October 2011 to engaging in
(Apr. 12, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/
2001/7984.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6NE-B7SM]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abb-ltd-and-two-subsidiaries-resolve-foreigncorrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-will-pay [https://perma.cc/ZN4S-VRSP].
99
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestonecorporation-agrees-plead-guilty-participating-conspiracies-rig-bids-and-bribe-0
[perma.cc/28LT-88TV] [hereinafter Bridgestone 2011 Press Release]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price
Fixing on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Feb. 13, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corp-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-automobile-parts-installed-us-cars [https://perma.cc/HN8W-PZDZ] [hereinafter
Bridgestone 2014 Press Release].
100
There is, of course, similarity in unlawful purpose in that the FCPA and
antitrust conspiracies were both engaged in to achieve greater profits. Obtaining
increased profits, however, is typically what motivates corporate misconduct. As
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has explained, “illegal behavior might increase rather
than reduce profits.” Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 6.
101
As with the Category 1 offense type, if the data set were expanded to
include deferred and non-prosecution agreements, additional corporate entities
would be identified that would also fit within Category 2. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Akzo Nobel Chems. Intern’l B.V., No. 06-0160 (N.D. Cal.
May 17, 2006) http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/216369.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6WAW-96J9]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Justice, Akzo Nobel Acknowledges Improper Payments Made by Its Subsidiaries to Iraqi Government Under
the U.N. Oil for Food Program, Enters Agreement with Department of Justice (Dec.
20, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/
07_crm_1024.html [https://perma.cc/2UFU-D4W5].

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 25

23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

14:02

1027

price-fixing within the marine hose industry, as well as to the
FCPA violations, it failed to disclose that it had also participated in an anti-vibration rubber parts conspiracy.102 When
Bridgestone’s additional anticompetitive behavior was discovered in 2014, it was sanctioned for not disclosing the misconduct in 2011.103 A DOJ Antitrust official stated that, “[t]he
Antitrust Division will take a hard line when repeat offenders
fail to disclose additional anticompetitive behavior.”104 Thus,
participating in multiple violations of the same underlying statute triggered mention that the firm was a repeat offender, but
as is shown in the Category 1 discussion, corporate entities
that violated different underlying statutes are often not treated
as repeat offenders.105
3. Category 3: No Similarities in Unlawful Behavior or
Purpose
Six corporate entities engaged in multiple violations in
compliance areas that were unrelated in both unlawful purpose and manner of misconduct. For example, BAE Systems
settled multiple incidents of unrelated misconduct from 2010
to 2015, including alleged violations of the FCPA106 and the

102

Bridgestone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99.
See Bridgestone 2011 Press Release, supra note 99; Bridgestone 2014
Press Release, supra note 99.
104
Bridgestone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99 (quoting Brent Snyder,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division).
105
It should be noted that the enforcement strategy at DOJ Antitrust is substantively different than that of other law enforcement agencies because it has
traditionally “place[d] little emphasis on the importance of an effective compliance
program to prevent cartel behavior.” Joseph Murphy & William Kolasky, The Role
of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing Cartel Behavior, 26 ANTITRUST 61,
63 (2012) http://summerconvention.utahbar.org/2014/materials/H2_Cartel%20Compliance%20Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ3B-ZBZX]. Indeed,
while “the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual instruct[s] federal prosecutors to consider compliance programs, the Antitrust Division obtained a complete carve-out for itself.”
Id. (footnotes omitted). Recent scholarship has, however, noted a recent shift in
antitrust policy towards a greater emphasis on the importance of adopting and
maintaining a robust compliance program. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Compliance,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 155, 155 (Michael A. Hitt et al.
eds., 2016).
106
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400million-criminal-fine [https://perma.cc/MYS2-ULUC].
103

R
R
R
R
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False Claims Act,107 as well as allegations of wrongful discrimination108 and violations of the Arms Export Control Act.109
***
The importance of the above categories should not be overblown, and the findings of the case study could be reframed as
demonstrating a continuum upon which corporate repeat misconduct of differing severity falls. The upshot, however, is that
firms in the above case study with multiple violations in different statutory or compliance areas have not been treated as
recidivists, despite, in some instances, similarities in their unlawful behavior and unlawful purposes across multiple violations. And the firms with repeated violations that have been
identified as recidivists have only been identified as such when
appearing before the same governmental actor on multiple
occasions.110
There could be a number of plausible reasons for the government’s failure to sanction repeat corporate misconduct. As
explained in Part I, different governmental actors handle different types of statutory and regulatory violations in a piecemeal
fashion. Additionally, the government currently does not seem
to track recidivist behavior across diverse statutory or regulatory areas. Moreover, the government does not employ an enforcement strategy that permits it to levy heightened sanctions
against firms that engage in repeated instances of legal violations across diverse regulatory or statutory areas. These
choices with regard to the government’s enforcement strategy,
however, may reflect information, coordination, or responsibility challenges, rather than signaling a strategy of purposeful
non-enforcement.
107
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defense Contractors Settle Alleged
Violation of the False Claims Act for $5.5 Million (Sept. 16, 2014), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/defense-contractors-settle-alleged-violation-falseclaims-act-55-million [https://perma.cc/2XRU-H7BQ].
108
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Virginia-Based BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc. (Dec. 28, 2011), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-virginia-basedbae-systems-ship-repair-inc [https://perma.cc/GK7U-6YTG].
109
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, BAE Systems plc Enters Civil Settlement
of Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of $79
Million (May 17, 2011), https://www.foley.com/files/BAES_StateDeptRelease18
may11.pdf [https://perma.cc/53EP-2U73].
110
See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11 United States v. ABB Inc., No. H-10-664
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (appearing twice before the DOJ); Bridgestone 2014 Press Release, supra note 99 (appearing twice before the DOJ).
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III
COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
Parts I and II have established that current regulatory and
enforcement priorities have led to a system of piecemeal compliance that fails to address firms that engage in repeated instances of misconduct. This Part begins by explaining how
information, coordination, and identified responsibility challenges may contribute, at least partially, to the government’s
failure to recognize and sanction repeat corporate misconduct.
The Part then argues that efforts to improve corporate compliance incentives would benefit from regulatory mechanisms
that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist
behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. The Part next
provides a proposal for reform, which utilizes existing reporting
obligations, a new compliance officer model within the DOJ,
and the Organizational Guidelines.
A. Information, Coordination, and Identified Responsibility
Challenges
Governmental enforcement agencies and actors are also
subject to the information and coordination complexities that
confront many regulatory agencies within the current administrative state. Importantly, these information and coordination
challenges may lead to a responsibility vacuum when considering issues of corporate recidivists.
The first challenge is the interagency coordination problem.111 “Congress often assigns more than one agency the
same or similar functions or divides authority among multiple
agencies, giving each responsibility for part of a larger
whole.”112 When scholars consider these problems, they typically focus on the fact that multiple agencies deal with the
same basic legal area or problem.113 As a result, the traditional
concern regarding interagency coordination is with “overlapping delegations of power”114 and, for purposes of this Article,
the redundancies that overlapping authority can create within
enforcement efforts.115 For example, both DOJ Fraud and the
SEC have authority to sanction companies for FCPA viola111
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).
112
Id.
113
See id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1135.
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tions.116 As a result, many FCPA violations result in sanctions
from both governmental entities, which necessarily require
sharing of information and procedural coordination between
the two governmental actors.117 For areas of law where interagency coordination has been readily identified, there have
been efforts by governmental agents to cooperate with each
other. For example, in response to the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, an interagency task force was created which included
representatives from the DOJ, the Department of Treasury, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the
SEC.118 Similarly, the DOJ’s Environment and Natural Resources Division often partners with the Environmental Protection Agency and state and local officials when prosecuting
pollution and wildlife crimes and pursuing civil enforcement
actions.119
The interagency coordination problem may arise differently
than how it is traditionally viewed, however, because of the
numerous governmental agencies and actors responsible for
sanctioning corporate misconduct as segmented participants
in a larger governmental enforcement strategy. Agencies that
might not be considered to have overlapping zones of authority
may in fact have an element of shared enforcement space because they may both need to sanction the same organization
for engaging in corporate misconduct. For example, the FCC
requires companies to comply with certain competitive bidding
rules domestically, while the FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign
officials.120 The shared regulatory space of the two governmental actors is not necessarily apparent when one focuses in on
the discrete statutory and regulatory area each actor is responsible for enforcing. But in practice, both the FCC and FCPA
may end up sanctioning an organization for engaging in unlaw116

SALEN CHURI ET AL., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, COMPLYING WITH THE FORCORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A PRACTICAL PRIMER 3 (2012), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/
FCPA_Compliance_Report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ATQ8-JSWA].
117
See, e.g., Warin et al., supra note 56, at 328–37 (discussing FCPA enforcement actions brought from 2004-2011 and highlighting when those actions were
brought by the SEC, DOJ, or both enforcement actors).
118
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, President Obama Establishes
Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009) https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm [https://perma.cc/32CP-MC6G].
The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force replaced the Corporate Fraud Task
Force, which was established in 2002. Id.
119
About the Division, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: ENV’T & NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division [https://perma.cc/J95N-QV8P].
120
See supra section II.C.1.
EIGN
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ful bribery activities.121 This raises the question of when, if
ever, it might be appropriate for seemingly diverse regulatory
agencies to share information about corporate misconduct and
sanctions in an effort to ensure that private firms have the
proper incentives to deter repeat corporate misconduct and
adopt the “effective compliance and ethics program” outlined in
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and espoused by senior governmental officials. Traditional attempts at improving
interagency coordination have focused on the initial enforcement action or prosecution and not on recidivist conduct,
which makes tackling the issue of repeat corporate misconduct
a unique issue in need of further consideration.
The second challenge is intra-agency coordination. Agency
heads, “as opposed to Congress[,]” are responsible for “design[ing] internal structures and processes to further their own
regulatory agendas.”122 Thus, while Congress delegates authority to the SEC to protect investors,123 the agency itself
makes decisions about its own organizational structure and
processes.124 Agencies that are responsible for corporations’
compliance with certain legal and regulatory requirements routinely have to work through various intra-agency coordination
problems. The DOJ, however, presents a unique challenge.
The DOJ is a cabinet-level agency,125 which is made up of a
variety of traditional administrative agencies.126 The DOJ is
responsible for handling “all criminal prosecutions and civil
suits in which the United States ha[s] an interest,” but it does
so through an organizational structure that includes “various
components, offices, boards and divisions.”127 Thus, the intraagency coordination challenges facing the DOJ are highly com121

Id.
Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429
(2015).
123
What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/E3FR-RPUA] (last modified June 10, 2013).
124
See, e.g., Delegation of Authority to the Director of its Division of Enforcement, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,348, 35,348 (June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 200) (outlining the SEC’s amendment of its internal rules to delegate authority
to issue witness immunity orders to the SEC Director of the Division of
Enforcement).
125
See Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Overview, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-andfunctions-manual-overview [https://perma.cc/J6EE-EHH9].
126
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations [https://perma.cc/
35HR-79DG] (explaining that “federal agencies such as ATF” must engage in
public rulemaking).
127
About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about [https://
perma.cc/4N97-EUAZ].
122
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plex and, in some instances, include what look more like interagency coordination issues. On a more basic level, however,
the DOJ also determines how to coordinate enforcement actions and it has done so through a variety of specialized divisions. These specialized divisions, like DOJ Antitrust and DOJ
Fraud, are faced with information and coordination problems
when both divisions have the opportunity or responsibility to
bring enforcement actions against the same organization for
misconduct.128 They can properly address the violations as
separate instances of misconduct without engaging in information sharing and coordination between divisions, but they can
also choose to work in a more cooperative manner, particularly
as it pertains to corporate repeat offenders.
The third challenge is a potential responsibility vacuum.
When multiple agencies or divisions are responsible for maintaining enforcement actions against the same company, they
tend to focus on their particular grant of authority. DOJ Antitrust focuses on ensuring that companies are not engaged in
anticompetitive behavior,129 while the SEC ensures that public
companies comply with the securities laws.130 But that leaves
open the question of which, if any, enforcement actor or agency
should be concerned when a company is engaged in repeated
instances of organizational misconduct across diverse regulatory areas.
B. Greater Detection & Increased Sanctions
Given current regulatory and enforcement behavior of governmental actors, compliance personnel within private firms
have strong incentives to ensure that a company that is found
to have engaged in a particular type of misconduct, such as
improper bribery of officials in an effort to obtain favorable
contracts, does not participate in future, similar misconduct.131 Those responsible for effectuating the firm’s compliance program have a strong incentive to revamp and bolster
efforts to ensure the firm’s long-term compliance with the particular regulatory or statutory requirement that led to the firm
receiving a governmental sanction.132 For example, in 2012,
128

See supra section II.C.2.
See Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/mission [https://perma.cc/TYU5-QXMV] (last updated July 20, 2015).
130
See supra note 123.
131
See supra subpart II.C.
132
See generally Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9–18 (using
economics to demonstrate why firms have strong incentives to stay in
compliance).
129
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Biomet entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
DOJ and SEC to resolve allegations that it violated the FCPA133
and agreed to retain a compliance monitor.134 Two years later,
Biomet disclosed possible further FCPA violations, which occurred both before and after Biomet entered into the 2012 deferred prosecution agreement. After a period of investigation,
the DOJ “informed Biomet that the [deferred prosecution
agreement] and the independent compliance monitor’s appointment [would be] extended for an additional year.”135
Thus, Biomet received an additional set of sanctions due to its
failure to effectively address flaws within its FCPA compliance
program.
Compliance personnel, however, have less of an incentive
to conduct a systematic overhaul or audit of the firm’s entire
compliance program in response to legally diverse instances of
misconduct. For example, HSBC’s conduct over the past several years has garnered a great deal of attention within certain
segments of the media, yet it has not been the subject of additional sanctions based on its recidivist conduct.136 Indeed, in
2012, a Senate subcommittee conducted a highly critical investigation of HSBC, which resulted in a 339-page report that
determined that the bank repeatedly failed to detect international money laundering, connections to terrorist financing,
and violations of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.137 Yet
even this strong evidence of significant compliance failures
within HSBC has not prompted governmental actors to treat
HSBC as a recidivist and require it to engage in a systematic,
comprehensive overhaul of its compliance programs and
policies.138
Thus, compliance personnel that serve as gatekeepers
within firms currently have weak incentives to focus on comprehensive compliance overhauls. In particular, while firms
133
Biomet, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 17, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351346/000090342315000219/biomet8k_0317.htm [https://perma.cc/76ZT-95M2] [hereinafter Biomet Form 8-K]; see
also Samuel Rubenfeld, The Morning Risk Report: Biomet Hit by Recidivism, WALL
STREET J.: RISK COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:24 AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2015/03/19/the-morning-risk-report-biomet-hit-by-bribery-recidivism/ [https://perma.cc/DVE6-TXXX].
134
See Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109,
122–23 (2016) [hereinafter Root, Modern-Day Monitorships] (discussing the rise of
monitorships and resulting differences amongst monitorship types).
135
Biomet Form 8-K, supra note 133.
136
See supra Introduction.
137
See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15.
138
See id.
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rely heavily on corporate “gatekeepers” to prevent and detect
compliance failures,139 they are also rational actors that respond to possible monetary fines as well as to the probability
that the government will levy such fines.140 By treating corporate misconduct across legal areas as separate and distinct
violations, governmental actors may be missing an opportunity
to make repeated violations more costly to corporations. As a
result, it may be that government regulators should consider
increasing the sanctions for corporate repeat offenders. Increasing sanctions may result in more desirable incentives for
corporate wrongdoers to engage in more effective self-policing
through improved internal compliance programs.141
Classic law and economics literature regarding deterrence,
however, assumes that “sanctioning repeat offenders more severely cannot be socially advantageous if deterrence always
induces first-best behavior.”142 In those instances, “[r]aising
the sanction because of [the repeat offender’s] record of prior
convictions would overdeter [the repeat offender] now.”143 Implicit, however, in this view of deterrence is that the government has chosen an appropriate sanction for corporate
misconduct, when in reality the state will often “tolerate some
underdeterrence in order to reduce enforcement expenses.”144
This reality is unsurprising when one considers that law
and economics theory has explained that strict liability enforcement, while the best regime “for inducing firms to sanction
culpable agents,”145 “may actually deter firms from monitoring,
investigating, or reporting” corporate misconduct.146 A private
139

Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 118–19.
Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9.
141
Recent scholarship, however, has suggested that the use of deferred or
non-prosecution agreements and similar prosecutorial mandates should be imposed “only on firms with policing deficiencies attributable to ‘policing agency
costs,’” which are “costs [that] arise when the firm’s senior managers or board of
directors personally benefit from either wrongdoing or deficient corporate policing.” Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Non-Prosecution, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833902. This scholarship, however, has not specifically addressed the situation of corporate repeat offenders
and whether instances of similar, repeat misconduct might warrant a different
type of governmental enforcement strategy.
142
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 438 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 701 (1997).
146
Id. at 707.
140
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firm subject to a strict liability regime will have a decreased
incentive to detect misconduct within its organization because
it will definitively result in a sanction for the firm without consideration of the corporation’s actions or culpability.
The upshot is that achieving perfect compliance with legal
and regulatory requirements within private firms may actually
deter those firms from implementing effective compliance and
ethics programs, and thus the government chooses not to hold
corporations responsible for obtaining perfect compliance,
thereby creating a world where there is underdeterrence.
[As such,] making sanctions depend on offense history may
be beneficial for two reasons. First, the use of offense history
may create an additional incentive not to violate the law: if
detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanction, but also a higher sanction for a future violation, [a repeat offender] will be deterred more from committing a
violation presently. Second, making sanctions depend on offense history allows society to take advantage of information
about the dangerousness of [repeat offenders] and the need
to deter them.147

Thus, if the government treated a firm that engaged in
repeat offenses within a specified period as a recidivist subject
to a heightened sanction regime, the government could address
challenges associated with underdeterrence and make noncompliance with legal and regulatory requirements a greater
priority for the firm. A simple economic analysis of the compliance function would “[a]ssume that employees in a rational,
profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm engage in random illegal
on-the-job conduct. The government imposes a fine ¢ on the
firm for proven violations, which is administered with
probability r. The firm [thus] experiences a sanction r¢ for
violations.”148 If governmental actors increase both the
probability of and the amount of a potential fine or other penalty, they can effectively increase the sanction of compliance for
both variables, thereby making recidivist behavior a particularly costly endeavor for the firm.
In short, efforts to improve corporate compliance may benefit from coordinated regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize
when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across
diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. By increasing the recognition of
firms engaged in recidivist conduct, governmental actors could
147
148

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 142, at 438–39 (footnote omitted).
Miller, Economic Analysis, supra note 26, at 9.
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increase the probability that a sanction might be levied against
the institution. By increasing the amount of monetary fines or
other penalties that a firm faces when it engages in recidivist
conduct, governmental actors can increase the “costs” of misconduct to the organization and encourage it to consider restructuring its entire compliance program. Employing such a
strategy would not be an effort meant to achieve perfect deterrence, but it instead would be a method of strengthening the
government’s current deterrence strategy by taking into account the practical reality that the government’s current enforcement regime does not in fact result in “perfect” deterrence
and instead sometimes underdeters corporate misconduct.
C. A Proposal for Reform
There are likely a variety of mechanisms that governmental
actors can employ to increase the probability of detection or the
potential fine or other penalties for organizations that engage in
recidivist conduct. This Article proposes mechanisms aimed to
make recidivism more costly within private firms, and these
proposals rely upon tools that are already available to governmental actors.149 The proposal outlined below could be implemented almost immediately, without the need for Congress to
pass a statute or for a regulator to engage in a lengthy noticeand-comment rulemaking process.
1. Proposal for Increasing Detection of Recidivist
Behavior
When the DOJ informed Biomet that it would be requiring
the deferred prosecution agreement and appointment of the
compliance monitor to be extended for another year, Biomet,
on the same day, reported this information to the SEC via Form
8-K.150 The SEC requires public companies to file a variety of
reports. Form 10-K is an annual filing and Form 10-Q is a
149
There are, however, arguments opposed to the idea that imposing more
severe sanctions will assist in deterring corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Miriam
H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (2016) (reviewing
Garrett, supra note 3) (“If you want to condemn corporate offenders, encourage
internal reform, and improve corporate culture, then perhaps you should do less.
Enact narrower theories of corporate criminal liability; devise laws and guidelines
that constrain prosecutorial and judicial discretion; and impose collateral consequences only in response to a predefined set of circumstances . . . .”); Griffith,
supra note 24, at 2134 (“Getting the government out of the compliance business
would prevent core corporate governance functions from being designed in an
opaque process by a largely unaccountable agent with no expertise in organizational design and no ability to measure effectiveness.”).
150
Biomet Form 8-K, supra note 133.
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quarterly filing.151 The SEC, however, requires public companies to “report certain material corporate events on a more
current basis.”152 “Form 8-K is the ‘current report’ companies
must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about.”153 Thus, Biomet’s filing of a Form
8-K on the day that the DOJ informed it that it would be subject to another year under the deferred prosecution agreement
and monitorship was not an accident. It was a requirement.
All public companies that enter into agreements to resolve
allegations of misconduct with governmental actors are required to file a Form 8-K disclosing the event to shareholders.
The disclosures would also be found within the firm’s quarterly
10-Q or annual 10-K, but the disclosure would be amongst
other required filing information. The Form 8-K, however, is
limited to discussions of current events; thus, when they are
filed, it becomes readily apparent to those reviewing the document what “major events” triggered the form’s filing.154
Government actors could implement a policy of reviewing
Form 8-Ks as a mechanism for detecting recidivist behavior by
firms. This system could be operationalized in a number of
ways, but a new officer within the DOJ provides a model for
how the DOJ could improve inter- and intra-agency coordination with regards to corporate recidivism.
In September 2015, the DOJ announced that it was “creating a new compliance counsel position in the Criminal Division
to assess the effectiveness of an entity’s compliance program
and help prosecutors decide whether or how to charge an entity
under investigation.”155 One key component of the new coun151
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION http://www.sec.gov/answers/
form8k.htm [https://perma.cc/P825-AWB3] [hereinafter Form 8-K].
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. While it does appear that some publicly traded firms attempt to mitigate the effect of filing negative news by providing the disclosure after trading
hours, this behavior by firms does not appear to have a significant impact on
investor behavior and would be irrelevant to the proposal outlined in this Article,
because the proposed review would not be tied to the market timing of the disclosure. See generally Benjamin Segal & Dan Segal, Are Managers Strategic in Reporting Non-Earnings News? Evidence on Timing and News Bundling, 21 REV.
ACCT. STUD. 1203, 1238 (2016) (“While managers are clearly timing the release of
negative news to exploit perceived investor inattention, there is no evidence of this
strategy bearing fruit.”).
155
Alison Tanchyk et al., Morgan Lewis Explains New DOJ Counsel to Focus on
Corporate Compliance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), http://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2015/09/11/morgan-lewis-explains-new-doj-counsel-to-focus-on-corporate-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/T94J-9D4U]. The compliance
counsel works specifically with DOJ Fraud at this time, but the DOJ could
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sel’s position is to distinguish between an effective compliance
program and a paper program.156 In November 2015, the DOJ
provided more details regarding the metrics the compliance
expert would utilize in determining whether and how a company should be charged criminally.157 The metrics have been
summarized as follows for organizations:
• Do directors and managers offer strong support for corporate compliance policies?
• Do compliance personnel have stature in the company?
Do the compliance teams get the resources they need?
• Are compliance policies clear and in writing? Are they easily understood and translated[?]
• Are the compliance policies effectively communicated to
employees? Are they easy to find and do employees get
repeated training?
• Are the compliance policies updated?
• Are there ways to enforce the compliance policies and is
compliance incentivized and violators disciplined?
• Are third parties informed of compliance expectations?158

Additionally, the compliance counsel’s assessment of compliance programs within financial institutions would also include
the following.
• Can the financial institution identify its customers?
• Is the company complying with U.S. laws?
• Are reports of suspicious activity shared with other
branches or offices?
• Do banks with a U.S. presence give U.S. senior managers
a “material role” in compliance?
• Is the company candid with regulators?159

Absent, almost shockingly so, is a metric looking at
whether the organization has engaged in past instances of misconduct. Because the new compliance counsel is delegated its
authority via the intra-agency discretion of the DOJ, the DOJ
department heads have complete authority and autonomy over
the metrics the compliance counsel utilizes in making her assessments regarding an organization’s compliance program.160
Adding an additional metric to the compliance counsel’s asbroaden the compliance counsel’s scope of authority or employ another compliance counsel with oversight over multiple DOJ divisions.
156
Id.
157
Dockery, supra note 70.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See Sue Reisinger, Report: Justice Dept. Names Chen to Controversial Compliance Counsel Post, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.
com/id=1202737784530/Report-Justice-Dept-Names-Chen-to-Controversial-
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sessment tools would be relatively easy to implement, particularly given the compliance counsel’s infancy within the DOJ.161
The current compliance counsel works exclusively with DOJ
Fraud, but the position could serve as a model for the type of
position the DOJ could create to assist it in its efforts to detect
recidivist behavior both within the DOJ and with other federal
regulators and agencies.
Thus, under this prong of the proposal, the government
could, for example, create a system whereby three settlement
disclosures via Form 8-Ks within a five-year period trigger an
automatic referral from the SEC to a new DOJ compliance
counsel as well as to any regulator with which the company
settled allegations of institutional misconduct within the preceding five years. After a review of the past instances of misconduct, if the DOJ compliance counsel were to determine that
the company was engaged in behavior that warrants recidivist
treatment, the DOJ could then flag the company as requiring
recidivist treatment if future misconduct by the firm is uncovered. In essence, the DOJ would have the tools necessary to
create a list of firms that should be treated as recidivists. The
list could be made available to all federal regulators along with
a request that the DOJ be notified if a regulator is contemplating entering into an agreement to settle claims of misconduct
by the relevant organization within the next few years.
In another formulation, the DOJ compliance counsel could
make it a part of her routine to regularly check Form 8-Ks
when assessing an organization’s compliance program. If Form
8-Ks from a specified period of time, like five years, indicated
multiple instances of misconduct, the compliance counsel
could consider that when determining what and how the DOJ
should ultimately pursue an enforcement action against the
corporation.
Regardless of how the review of Form 8-Ks is operationalized by DOJ compliance counsel, the government is already in
possession of all the data and resources it needs to allow it to
effectively assess the types of misconduct that corporations are
resolving with governmental actors. The upshot is that the
government could improve its ability to detect recidivist behavior without requiring corporations to disclose additional information. Increased detection of recidivist behavior could result
Compliance-Counsel-Post?slreturn=20151010192409 [https://perma.cc/Y94DXTLT].
161
The compliance counsel began work at the DOJ on November 3, 2015. See
Dockery, supra note 70.
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in a greater probability that additional sanctions might be levied against firms that engage in repeated acts of misconduct
across diverse legal and regulatory areas.
2. Proposal for Increasing Potential Fines or Other
Penalties
Traditional economic analysis suggests that a sufficient
monetary fine can deter misconduct within private firms.162
The sophisticated corporation of today, however, should probably budget for an expected monetary penalty as a result of
institutional misconduct. HSBC, for example, has paid literally
billions of dollars in fines over the past five years. As part of the
company’s 2012 deferred prosecution agreement alone, HSBC
agreed to pay $1.92 billion in fines,163 yet the company has
continued to engage in various forms of misconduct and, as a
result, has been subjected to additional penalties in the form of
high fines.164
Thus, it appears that the private firms of today are all too
willing to pay monetary fines as a consequence for failing to
prevent and detect misconduct. These same firms, however,
have shown a strong distaste for other forms of non-monetary
penalties. Governmental actors, of course, routinely use a
package of monetary and non-monetary penalties in their attempts to create incentives for corporations to behave in an
ethical and compliant manner.165 But this Article proposes
that governmental actors should consider finding additional,
non-monetary penalties that are generally considered to be undesirable to private firms and levy those “heightened” penalties
against recidivist firms in addition to more standard monetary
162
See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16 (“The most effective
sanction against an offending organization is a fine; but fines can be obtained in
civil enforcement actions without the high burden of proof and constitutional
protections required in criminal cases.”). But see Sonia A. Steinway, Comment,
SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What Do They Say? A Critical
Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 222–24
(2014) (explaining the mixed evidence for fines as an effective enforcement tool for
corporations).
163
Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in
Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M201212
11 [https://perma.cc/4A9C-BAD8].
164
See supra Introduction.
165
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 32, at 71 (2014) (criticizing the ability of
prosecutors to engage in effective corporate governance reform efforts); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Rehabilitating Corporations, 66 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 1, 3 (2014)
(suggesting judges take a more active role in overseeing the agreed-upon
penalties).
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fines and non-monetary penalties. There are likely a variety of
particularly distasteful non-monetary penalties—penalties that
corporations would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid—that
the government could promote as part of its enforcement
strategies.
This Article proposes that the government focus on three
such penalties, which are graduated in nature. Adopting these
three penalties would permit the government to adopt an enforcement strategy that increases its criminal enforcement actions against recidivist corporations while substantially
decreasing potential civil resolutions of corporate misconduct
for recidivists. In particular, public companies that have engaged in wrongdoing are reluctant to (i) receive a concrete finding of guilt166 that declares that the firm participated in
conduct that violates legal and regulatory requirements;
(ii) allow broad, direct access of its internal workings to governmental actors out of fear that this information could flow to
third-parties and be used against the firm in subsequent civil
litigation;167 and (iii) cede authority to a court-appointed
master, trustee, or monitor.168 These sorts of penalties are
considered to be especially unpalatable to private firms, which
makes them particularly well-suited for creating incentives for
corporations to make comprehensive compliance reform a priority before they engage in recidivist conduct and can become
subject to these sorts of heightened penalties.
a. Pursue Official Findings of Guilt
Governmental actors’ reliance upon civil enforcement actions is rational given the reluctance on the part of corporations to enter into guilty pleas acknowledging criminal
behavior.
Organizational defendants don’t want to admit to criminal
behavior, both because doing so will damage their reputations and also because the plea may be used against them in
subsequent civil litigation. In many cases, therefore, the
166

Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16–17.
See, e.g., Root, Monitor-“Client,” supra note 56, at 545–48 (discussing AIG’s
reluctance to enter into a settlement agreement without an order of binding confidentiality from the court that would prevent the monitor from turning over its
findings to parties other than the government).
168
See Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 116–22 (discussing
the use of traditional, court-appointed monitorships and modern-day, court-ordered monitorships and the customary unwillingness of companies to enter into
those types of monitorships).
167

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt

1042

unknown

Seq: 40

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

23-MAY-17

14:02

[Vol. 102:1003

need to admit guilt in a plea bargain will be a stumbling block
to settlement.
To avoid this problem, the government has devised alternative remedies: deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)
and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).169

However, the government’s reliance on civil enforcement actions puts limits on the government’s ability to utilize the Organizational Guidelines, which contemplate a regime of increased
sanctions for recidivist firms by providing heightened penalties
for firms that engage in “similar misconduct.”170 If governmental actors pursue a strategy aimed at obtaining findings of guilt
from recidivist organizations, whether by plea or fact-finder
determination, it would function as a heightened penalty as
compared to the status quo and, if a finding of guilt were obtained, it would make additional, non-monetary penalties
available for the government to seek against the recidivist corporation. Pursuing official findings of guilt against corporations might initially appear much more costly than entering
into negotiated settlement agreements, but many firms will
plead guilty without risking the costs of going to trial where, if
found guilty, they could be subject to greater monetary fines
and other penalties than if they were to enter into a plea agreement.171 Thus, the additional costs of pursuing official findings of guilt may not, in practice, be significant.
b. Allowing the Government Broad Access to the Firm’s
Internal Workings
The Organizational Guidelines, which are the proper
source of authority for determining an organization’s sanction
after a finding of guilt or guilty plea, provide a framework for
levying higher penalties on firms that engage in recidivist behavior. Indeed, in its Introductory Commentary, the Organizational Guidelines outline four factors that will “increase the
ultimate punishment of an organization,” and one of those factors is “the prior history of the organization.”172 The guidelines
169

Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 16–17.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(F) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
171
See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV.
1775, 1786, 1789 (2011) (explaining that even when prosecutors “seek an indictment and conviction,” which can have “possibly dire consequences for the corporations,” they “typically result[ ] in a plea bargain and not a trial,” and noting that
if, for example, Siemens had been convicted at trial, the possible fines it would
have been required to pay would have been much greater than what it paid under
a plea agreement).
172
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt.
170
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explain that “[r]ecurrence of similar misconduct creates doubt
regarding whether the organization took reasonable steps” to
meet the guidelines’ admonishment to adopt an effective compliance and ethics program.173 Thus, the guidelines set out a
variety of consequences for organizations that are found guilty
or who have pleaded guilty to engaging in misconduct and for
firms that engage in recidivist behavior.
One such consequence is a term of corporate probation.174
The government cannot guarantee that a court will order a
term of corporate probation, but it can adopt a strategy of
aggressively recommending that the court order a period of
corporate probation for firms that engage in recidivist conduct.
The guidelines outline several conditions that “may be appropriate” to order as part of an organization’s corporate probation.175 One available condition states that:
The organization shall submit to: (A) a reasonable number of
regular or unannounced examinations of its books and
records at appropriate business premises by the probation
officer or experts engaged by the court; and (B) interrogation
of knowledgeable individuals within the organization. Compensation to and costs of any experts engaged by the court
shall be paid by the organization.176

Corporations who are engaged in misconduct often spend a
great deal of time and money avoiding penalties of this nature,
in part, because once information is provided to the government, it can be subject to certain reporting obligations under
the Freedom of Information Act.177 Additionally, information
that becomes part of a “judicial record” is typically information
that courts must make publicly available, and if a court uses
the information gathered by the probation office or expert, it
could transform the businesses information into a publicly
available, judicial record.178
Thus, if governmental actors adopt an enforcement strategy that attempts to achieve, as a condition of probation, broad
access to the internal workings of recidivist firms, it would
likely serve to heighten the penalties associated with engaging
in recidivist behavior. This, in turn, would create an incentive
173

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt 2(D).
See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (describing scenarios where the court is required to order probation).
175
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b).
176
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b)(5).
177
See Root, Monitor-“Client,” supra note 56, at 547.
178
For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Root, Monitor-“Client,”
supra note 56, at 540–49.
174
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for private firms to ensure their compliance programs are effective on a comprehensive, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis
when incidents of misconduct occur and trigger a compliance
review.
c. Court-Appointed Master, Trustee, or Monitor
The Organizational Guidelines also outline a set of heightened penalties for firms that (i) were found to be guilty of engaging in misconduct, (ii) were ordered to undergo a term of
corporate probation, and (iii) violated a condition of probation.179 “Upon a finding of a violation of a condition of probation, the court may extend the term of probation, impose more
restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke probation and resentence the organization.”180 The Commentary to § 8F1.1
goes on to explain that “[i]n the event of repeated violations of
conditions of probation, the appointment of a master or trustee
may be appropriate to ensure compliance with court orders.”181
Corporations do not like retaining monitors in a civil context where, arguably, the corporation has some power to negotiate the scope of the monitorship and the breadth of the
monitor’s duties.182 Thus, it is unsurprising that corporations
(i) appear to hold a great deal of disdain for the imposition of
court-ordered masters, trustees, or monitors and (ii) have engaged in protracted battles to invalidate court mandates imposing these sort of third parties.183
Again, governmental actors cannot guarantee that the
court will appoint a master, trustee, or monitor, but they can
choose to adopt an enforcement strategy that aggressively lobbies the court to formally impose a master, trustee, or monitor
when a private firm is involved in repeated instances of wrongdoing. The adoption of such a strategy would likely serve to
increase the non-monetary penalties that firms would be subject to in the case of recidivism, and it would provide a strong
incentive for corporations to ensure that their compliance programs are designed to ensure comprehensive, as opposed to
piecemeal, compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.
179

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8F1.1.
Id.
181
Id. cmt.
182
See generally Root, Monitor-“Client,” supra note 56, at 540–49 (discussing
negotiated monitorships); Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at
133–37 (describing Apple’s court battle to limit the scope of its monitorship);
Warin et al., supra note 56, at 365–68 (describing how a corporation may negotiate the scope of a monitorship).
183
See Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, supra note 134, at 130–37 (discussing
court-ordered monitorships).
180
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***
The proposals outlined would enable the government to
adopt an enforcement strategy that increases the potential
sanction for corporate repeat offenders by utilizing existing
governmental resources and policies. Increased coordination
amongst various governmental actors paired with a shift in the
sanctions pursued against corporate repeat offenders would
create a strong incentive for firms to assess the effectiveness of
their compliance programs as a whole when misconduct occurs
as opposed to focusing narrowly on a particular compliance
area.
IV
BENEFITS, OBJECTIONS, & UNRESOLVED CONCERNS
This Article’s proposed framework has several potential
benefits if embraced by governmental actors, and this Part begins with a description of a few such benefits. The Part goes on
to discuss objections to the proposal presented. The Part concludes by addressing some unresolved concerns raised by the
Article.
A. Potential Benefits
This Part will address five ways in which this Article’s proposal might assist in efforts to improve compliance programs
within private firms. First, it will improve the ability of the
government to identify and sanction corporate repeat offenders. Second, the detection mechanism outlined allows for an
unbiased standard for reviewing an organization’s past misconduct. Third, the Article’s proposal is based on a “standard”
instead of an easy to manipulate “bright-line rule.” Fourth, it
will encourage organizations to put a greater emphasis on architecture, as opposed to policing, strategies when focusing on
their compliance programs. Fifth, the proposal may encourage
private firms to put a greater emphasis on promoting ethicality
in their workforce.
1. Improved Ability to Treat Recidivists as Such
Subpart III.A explained how information, coordination, and
reputation challenges or deficiencies contribute to the government’s failure to properly detect and aggressively sanction corporate repeat offenders. This Article’s proposal directly
addresses these problems.
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To the extent that a lack of information contributed to the
government’s failure to properly detect corporate repeat offenders, the proposal’s reliance on Form 8-Ks allows reliable, nonbiased information to serve as the basis for a review of the
relevant corporate entity for recidivist conduct.184 Form 8-K
review will allow for both interagency coordination of the information, because any enforcement action brought by agencies
outside of the DOJ would be captured in Form 8-K reporting,
and intra-agency coordination, because enforcement actions
brought by separate divisions of the DOJ would also be captured. Form 8-Ks provide a concrete and reliable mechanism
for identifying prior civil and criminal enforcement actions
brought against the corporate wrongdoer.
One might, however, question whether there is actually an
information problem amongst governmental agencies and actors because enforcement actions are often easy to discover
when one runs an internet search or follows certain enforcement and compliance news sources.185 One might argue that
governmental enforcement agents should begin enforcement
actions by running a corporate background check, so to speak,
to determine whether other corporate misconduct has recently
occurred. If previous offenses are identified, the government
enforcement agent could choose to require a more draconian
sanction than what it would normally pursue. This is important because if government enforcement agents are aware of
past misconduct and actively choose not to pursue heightened
sanctions, it might not indicate an information problem but
instead reflect the government’s unwillingness to sanction corporate repeat offenders.186 The lack of heightened sanctions
for recidivists may merely be a reflection of a lack of political
will and not indicative of any sort of information problem or
deficiency.
The information problem raised by this Article, however,
does not take place in a vacuum, and the Article is not claiming
that government enforcement agents are technically unaware
of the enforcement actions brought by their counterparts at
other agencies. Instead, the Article is arguing that the information problem is inextricably tied to the coordination and re184
See Form 8-K, supra note 151 (describing all corporate activities that require investor notification).
185
See, e.g., COMPLIANCE WEEK, https://www.complianceweek.com [https://
perma.cc/L6V6-2U4M] (reporting and analyzing enforcement actions).
186
But see Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033,
1035 (2012) (explaining that a government policy avoiding punitive measures
against companies may be meant to avoid harming innocent third-parties).
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sponsibility challenges associated with inter- and intra-agency
coordination and related to the incentivizing of corporations to
adopt ethics and compliance programs that will prevent corporate recidivism.
DOJ Fraud may be aware that it is entering into a settlement agreement with a company that entered into an agreement with the FCC the previous year, but DOJ Fraud has no
current incentive to expend additional resources for pursuing
recidivist conduct that is unrelated to the types of misconduct
DOJ Fraud is charged with prosecuting. DOJ Fraud has a
limited budget and limited resources in the form of attorneys
and other employees, so it is likely rational for DOJ Fraud to be
concerned solely with the types of corporate misconduct within
its zone of responsibility.
Thus, this Article’s proposal seeks to coordinate formal review of enforcement actions brought by diverse governmental
agents via Form 8-K review and to designate responsibility for
this review to a particular person (or persons) responsible for
considering whether a corporation has an effective ethics and
compliance program. By tasking a specific individual with reviewing the Form 8-Ks, someone within the DOJ will have specific authority for making recommendations regarding the
appropriate enforcement strategy against a particular corporation. This individual could be given direct responsibility and, if
deemed appropriate by DOJ agency heads, could alert other
interested governmental actors and agencies to the compliance
counsel’s findings. Thus, the individual line attorney at DOJ
Fraud would no longer be responsible for considering whether
a heightened sanction should be pursued in a particular manner due to the corporate defendants past, unrelated misconduct. Instead, the individual line attorney would get a formal
recommendation by the new DOJ compliance counsel to pursue a more aggressive sanction. This formal recommendation
would help motivate the individual line attorney to pursue
more aggressive sanctions against corporate repeat offenders
as part of larger enforcement efforts that are more expansive
than the goals of the attorney’s particular agency or
department.
Thus, this Article’s proposal promotes a more coordinated
enforcement effort amongst various governmental enforcement
actors. This coordinated effort will allow for more complete
consideration of whether a corporation’s compliance program
is deficient in some manner.
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2. Unbiased Standard for Detection and Evaluation
Another benefit of the Article’s proposal is that it utilizes an
unbiased standard for detecting and evaluating repeated instances of misconduct at private firms. Utilizing the Form 8-K
for detecting repeat offenders ensures that the detection mechanism is not easy to manipulate based on the notoriety of the
company or past instances of misconduct. This Article’s detection mechanism allows an unbiased trigger to prompt the compliance counsel’s review of past misconduct by public
companies. Without an unbiased mechanism, one might be
concerned that a recidivism review would occur most often
when there was widespread knowledge of an organization’s
misconduct, but that would allow smaller companies or companies whose misconduct is of the sort that is unlikely to garner much media attention to escape heightened sanctions for
recidivist conduct.
3. Proposes a “Standard” Verses a “Rule”
Additionally, the compliance counsel’s review is part of a
“standard,” not a “rule.” Once a corporate entity is referred to
the compliance counsel for consideration regarding the effectiveness of the firm’s compliance program, the proposal allows
for an independent review of the corporate entity’s policies and
procedures when making a determination as to whether the
firm should be subject to more aggressive enforcement actions
and sanctions. Thus, this Article’s proposal is more of a standard than a rule, because it does not require recidivist treatment when a corporation has engaged in a particular number
of offenses. Instead, the proposal leaves discretion with the
compliance counsel and the relevant enforcement officials
about the best way to proceed in addressing issues of compliance at a particular corporate entity, given the particular facts
and circumstances presented.
In this context, a rule might be easy for a corporate entity
to game for its advantage.187 For example, if a rule was
adopted that five settlement agreements within a five-year period automatically required a more aggressive prosecutorial
187
See, e.g., Allan Sloan, Treasury’s Game of Whac-A-Mole: Keeping Corporate
Taxes in the USA, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/treasury-will-need-to-bring-its-a-game-of-whac-a-mole/
2016/04/01/94431f06-f675-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html [https://
perma.cc/SQA5-FEXZ] (describing the Treasury Department’s struggle to enforce
penalties against companies that evade US tax authorities through corporate
inversions).
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posture by the DOJ, a company might not be motivated to
overhaul its compliance program until it entered the fourth
settlement. Alternatively, the company may attempt to stall
entering into a fifth settlement agreement until a time period
where earlier settlement agreements fell outside the relevant
five-year period. Rules are easy to predict and, therefore, easy
to game.
However, the standard outlined in this Article’s proposal is
less vulnerable to corporate gamesmanship because elements
of prosecutorial discretion remain intact. The proposal addresses the coordination problems inherent in the U.S. enforcement structure and apparatus, but does not sacrifice the
individualized review necessary to ensure that more aggressive
prosecutions are brought only when warranted by the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the effectiveness of
the ethics and compliance program at the firm being evaluated.
4. Greater Emphasis on Corporate Architecture Strategies
This Article’s proposal, by improving coordination amongst
governmental enforcement agents and encouraging more aggressive prosecutions and sanctions for corporate repeat offenders, is aimed at incentivizing corporations to improve their
compliance programs. There are, however, different types of
compliance activity within firms.
Much of the work engaged in by compliance professionals
falls into two broad categories: “the corporate policing approach that is familiar to many[ ] and a structural approach
one might call ‘corporate architecture.’”188 “The policing approach reduces corporate crime by empowering internal policemen to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be
transgressors.”189 In contrast, the “architectural approach encourages corporate personnel to seek out and mitigate problematic situations as opposed to problematic people. It seeks
proactively to improve decision-making systems, thereby reducing the opportunity and temptation for fraud. It is at once
less judgmental and yet potentially more intrusive.”190
The corporate policing approach is easier for firms to implement, but the corporate architecture approach is equally
important.191 If governmental actors were to engage in efforts
to treat repeat offender firms as recidivists, it might encourage
188
189
190
191

Baer, supra note at 31, at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94.
See id. at 148.
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corporations to increase the amount of time they spend engaging in corporate architecture strategies. Instead of focusing
almost solely on detecting and punishing misconduct, firms
would need to think more proactively about areas where they
are vulnerable to compliance failures. In turn, firms would
need to identify and implement proactive strategies aimed at
mitigating compliance failures that might occur in the future
based on their risk assessment.
An emphasis on increased policing, as opposed to better
corporate architecture strategies, is evident in numerous responses to corporate misconduct. For example, JPMorgan recently adopted an aggressive policing strategy in response to
“government probes into fraudulent mortgage-bond sales, the
$6.2 billion London Whale trading loss, services provided to
Ponzi-scheme operator Bernard Madoff and the rigging of currency and energy markets.”192 In the past three years, the
company “has hired 2,500 [new] compliance workers and spent
$730 million” to improve its compliance operations.193 Additionally, the company is utilizing an algorithm with dozens of
inputs in an attempt to “identify rogue employees before they
go astray.”194 JPMorgan’s clear response to corporate misconduct is to strengthen its internal policing strategies, but policing strategies are only one piece of an effective ethics and
compliance program.
JPMorgan’s emphasis on policing strategies is important
because excessive monitoring and policing of employees “may
unintentionally erode compliance norms” within firms.195 “For
example, heavy-handed [policing] methods may trigger feelings
of distrust among employees, thereby reducing internal motivations to comply with the law.”196 Corporate architecture
strategies, however, require firms to collaborate with their employees to avoid engaging in misconduct, thereby empowering
employees to assist the firm in its compliance efforts.197 The
government’s current enforcement regime promotes, and at
times rewards, aggressive policing, but that appears to come at
192
Hugh Son, JPMorgan Algorithm Knows You’re a Rogue Employee Before
You Do, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-04-08/jpmorgan-algorithm-knows-you-re-a-rogue-employeebefore-you-do [https://perma.cc/C63E-KL5P].
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Baer, supra note 31, at 136.
196
Id.
197
See id. at 134–35.
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the expense of more difficult to craft corporate architecture
strategies.
5. Emphasizing Ethicality
Today’s discussions of compliance often take place without
any corresponding emphasis on the importance of promoting
ethicality.198 Many perceive issues surrounding ethicality to be
separate from issues of compliance, yet research from the fields
of behavioral ethics and behavioral legal ethics suggests that
separating ethics from compliance strategies may in fact be
harmful to the firm.199
In part, this is because “aggressive compliance monitoring
can have an unfavorable effect on the motivation of agents to
comply with rules.”200 Behavioral ethics literature demonstrates that when individuals are told to comply with rules for
the sake of compliance instead of for the sake of acting ethically, it can actually diminish ethical behavior within firms.201
Behavioral ethics research also demonstrates that mandating
specific goals can create systematic problems. Specifically,
they can encourage employees to “1. focus too narrowly on
their goals, to the neglect of nongoal areas; 2. engage in risky
behavior; 3. focus on extrinsic motivators and lose their intrinsic motivation; 4. and, most importantly . . . , engage in more
unethical behavior than they would otherwise.”202
By encouraging a more comprehensive overhaul of firms’
compliance programs, governmental actors may prompt compliance gatekeepers within firms to consider questions of ethics
in addition to questions associated with ensuring effective policing methods within the organization. The Organizational
Guidelines already state that firms should engage in employing
an effective compliance and ethics program, so a return to
considerations of ethicality when considering issues of compliance within firms does not appear to be a dramatic or unprecedented action.203 Indeed, it could be a valuable use of time and
energy for an organization attempting to create an organiza198
See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Essay, Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1973
(2006).
199
Indeed, in Professor Miller’s recent overview of the compliance function, he
asserts that “the law of compliance shares an uneasy boundary with a broader set
of issues that might loosely be termed ‘ethics beyond compliance.’” Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 18.
200
Regan, supra note 198, at 1970.
201
See MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS 103-07 (2011).
202
Id. at 104.
203
See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 12.
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tional culture that discourages misconduct and encourages
ethical conduct.
B. Objections
Despite the many benefits to this Article’s proposed framework, there are some potential objections. This section will
outline three. First, whether interagency coordination may actually produce harmful results for efforts to quell recidivist corporate misconduct. Second, whether it is appropriate to
sanction organizations with complex structures in a uniform
manner. Third, whether the proposal’s focus on public companies is too narrow in scope.
1. Might Interagency Coordination Actually Produce
Harmful Results?
This Article proposes improving the sharing of information
and cooperation of diverse regulatory agencies in an effort to
encourage sanctions for recidivist corporate misconduct.
There are, however, a variety of potential downsides to increased coordination amongst agencies.
First, increased coordination “can make less resilient the
legal safeguards pursuant to which individual agencies carry
out their missions.”204 For example, if an agency that typically
pursues only civil penalties begins to coordinate with the DOJ,
it may be that an offense that Congress meant to be remedied
in a civil context may result in a company receiving a heightened sanction due to a determination that the company is a
recidivist when a subsequent, similar offense is discovered.
Second, if agencies with shared but distinct enforcement space
begin to coordinate in actions brought against corporations, it
may present a unique challenge if judicial review of the coordinated-agency action must be obtained. Courts typically review
administrative action “of a single agency operating in relative
insularity from other administrative actors, exercising formal
legal authority through discrete actions that resemble lawmaking or adjudication.”205 If courts must instead review coordinated-agency action, it may be difficult to parse which actions
are acceptable for which governmental actors. Third, if governmental actors decide to coordinate on their own accord, “the
resulting arrangements are not only of far lower visibility than
legislative enactments, but they are also prone to self-dealing
204
205

Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 252–60 (2015).
Id. at 268.
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by the enforcers” engaged in the coordination effort.206 Fourth,
an increased level of coordination between administrative
agencies and the DOJ may allow an agency to refer a case to
the DOJ that the agency does not want to expend resources
pursuing, thereby allowing it to blame the DOJ if it determines
not to go forward with the case.207 Fifth, the role of prosecutors, like those found at the DOJ, is typically understood to
“require a certain level of independence to make their decisions
without inappropriate and extraneous political pressures.”208
If the DOJ is required to engage in a coordinated effort with
external agencies, it might infringe on the DOJ’s independent
assessments and decision making.
The above are just a few of what are many potential concerns when one considers the drawbacks associated with interagency coordination and the sharing of information and
responsibility across distinct regulatory actors. These concerns should not be ignored, but they should also be assessed
in a slightly different way when one considers their application
to an interagency coordination strategy aimed at addressing
recidivist conduct.
The firms subject to this Article’s proposal will necessarily
have had multiple encounters with government actors as a
result of corporate misconduct. These encounters would have
been initiated and assessed on an individual basis long before
the type of coordination proposed by this Article would even
begin to be contemplated. As a result, the legitimacy of the
initial enforcement actions would not be subject to the complexities created by interagency coordination. Additionally, the
coordination suggested in this Article consists of an independent assessment by a DOJ official, thereby allowing the DOJ to
maintain independence in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. That is not to suggest that challenges or downsides associated with interagency coordination would not exist in an
effort aimed at sanctioning repeat corporate offenders in an
effort to increase incentives for firms to improve their compliance programs. It does, however, suggest that the traditional
206
Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local
Law Enforcement, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, at 81, 102 (Charles M. Friel ed.,
2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M74F-4PK9] (discussing coordination amongst state and federal enforcement authorities).
207
See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 763–65 (2003).
208
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 438 (2001).
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concerns regarding interagency coordination may not be as
significant in a regime aimed at coordinating sanctions for recidivist conduct by corporate offenders.
2. Is it Appropriate to Sanction Organizations with
Complex Structures in a Uniform Manner?
Today’s corporate organizations are complex. Some firms
have a variety of related entities or subsidiaries. For example,
HSBC, like many public companies, has several subsidiaries.209 The instances of misconduct outlined in the Introduction were committed by a variety of HSBC subsidiaries.210
Other organizations are extremely large organizations with relatively siloed departments that function autonomously as
mini-companies.211 Thus, a legitimate question exists as to
whether organizations with complex structures should be
treated as one entity for purposes of a recidivism review.212
Importantly, this Article’s proposal is consistent with the
manner in which corporations and the DOJ currently negotiate
settlement agreements. The DOJ treats related corporate entities as if they are one unit, so it would seem appropriate to
develop a strategy that does the same.213 For example, when
three Hewlett-Packard subsidiaries settled FCPA violations, the
parent company, while not entering into an agreement with
DOJ Fraud, “committed to maintain and continue enhancing
its compliance program and internal accounting controls.”214
In another example, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to make changes to
its compliance program across all of its related entities. Specifically, the agreement states:
Alcatel-Lucent represents that it has implemented and will
continue to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA, the anticorruption provisions of French law, and other applicable
209
See Miller, Compliance Function, supra note 32, at 18 (describing how
organizations can benefit from a favorable public image or psychological benefits
for members of the organization).
210
See Simplified Structure Chart, HSBC (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.
hsbc.com/~/media/hsbc-com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network/pdfs/groupstructure-chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K83-9PXH].
211
Coca-Cola stands as a classic example of a multinational enterprise that
silos its various businesses extensively. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1345, 1354–55 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
212
A robust analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article and will
be the focus of a future project.
213
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Hewlett-Packard Polska, supra note 96.
214
Id. ¶ 4.
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anti-corruption laws throughout its operations, including
those of its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures, and those of
its contractors and subcontractors, with responsibilities that
include interacting with foreign officials or other high risk
activities.215

In yet another example, when Vetco International and four of
its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to FCPA violations, the parent
company agreed to assume all of the obligations “on behalf of
each of its Vetco Gray subsidiaries.”216 Thus, the DOJ and
corporations appear not to adhere to technical concerns regarding the separate legal status of related corporate entities
when entering into settlement agreements. As such, it appears
appropriate to consider repeat misconduct across subsidiaries
when considering whether a corporate entity may be a
recidivist.
Additionally, this Article’s proposal does not outline a
broad-based rule; it outlines a standard by which DOJ compliance counsel can make an individualized assessment regarding an organization’s compliance program. Nothing in the
proposal prevents DOJ compliance counsel, or individual prosecutors charged with bringing an enforcement action against a
company, from determining whether it appears appropriate to
treat separate instances of misconduct independently. The
proposal outlined leaves a great deal of discretion with prosecutors to make the charging decisions they deem appropriate
given the totality of the circumstances before them.
Thus, while concerns regarding the appropriate treatment
of corporations with complex organizational structures are legitimate in this context and would benefit from further research, those considerations are not dispositive to the claims
outlined in this Article.
3. Is a Proposal Aimed at Public Companies Too Narrow?
This Article focuses on misconduct at public companies,
and the proposal outlined in Part III is crafted in a manner
meant to incentivize public companies to overhaul their compliance programs. Yet organizational misconduct is not limited
to public companies. Thus, a legitimate criticism might be
raised regarding the wisdom of putting forth a proposal that is
inherently limited in its ability to deter repeat corporate mis215
Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 8, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.,
No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010), ECF No. 10 (emphasis added).
216
Plea Agreement ¶ 10, United States v. Vetco Gray UK Ltd., No. CR-H-07004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), ECF No. 26.
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conduct because only public companies are required to file
Form 8-Ks, thus only public companies would receive a recidivism review.
Yet the reality is that incentivizing more ethical institutions, which will pursue strategies that may result in effective
compliance programs, requires a multifaceted approach. This
Article’s proposals will not and cannot create a perfect set of
incentives to ensure that all organizations establish effective
ethics and compliance programs. However, this Article’s proposal, if adopted, will address some of the coordination challenges that are an inherent part of the current U.S. regulatory
structure and will provide an additional incentive for firms to
implement policies that will address compliance deficiencies on
a wholesale, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis.
C. Unresolved Concerns
There are a variety of open questions raised by this Article’s
suggestions and proposal. This Part will discuss two such
questions. First, what factors should the DOJ compliance
counsel consider when determining whether an organization
should be treated as a corporate repeat offender? Second, what
types of misconduct should be considered in a repeat offender
assessment?
1. When Should an Organization Be Treated as a Repeat
Offender?
One question raised by the case study in subpart III.C is
when an organization should be treated as a repeat offender.
The case study identified three categories of repeated misconduct. Category 1 includes multiple offenses with the same or
similar unlawful objectives and behavior. Category 2 includes
multiple offenses with the same or similar unlawful behavior
but dissimilar unlawful objectives. Category 3 includes multiple offenses that do not share any characteristics in terms of
the type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose.
This issue might benefit from further research, particularly
as it relates to Category 2, but it seems most important that
companies falling into Category 1 be treated as repeat offenders. The companies outlined in Category 1 appear to have institutional deficiencies in creating a culture that disavows
bribery as a mechanism for obtaining a competitive business
advantage. When organizational misconduct contains these
types of similarities, it may be appropriate to treat the organization as a repeat offender. In contrast, the companies out-
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lined in Category 3 do not appear to have entered into
misconduct that looks in any way related. Thus, the misconduct identified looks less likely to reflect some sort of underlying deficiency with the firm’s compliance program.
Importantly, this Article is not advocating for a bright-line
rule establishing what does and does not count as recidivist
behavior for corporate offenders. Instead, the Article purposefully leaves a determination of what should count as recidivist
conduct firmly within the discretion of the governmental actor
considering whether the types of corporate misconduct that
have occurred are sufficiently similar to warrant a label of recidivist and a correspondingly heightened sanction.
2. What Legal Areas Should Be Part of a Repeat
Offender Assessment?
There are a multitude of ways that a corporation can violate legal or regulatory requirements. Another legitimate question is what types of violations should “count” when
determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat
offender.
Again, this issue would likely benefit from additional research, but it appears as if organizational misconduct can be
divided into two basic groups. The first includes misconduct
that is traditionally enforced through public means, so through
formal, governmental action (e.g., governmental prosecutions).
The second includes misconduct that is traditionally enforced
through private means (e.g., employment discrimination
lawsuits).
Because this Article is focused on how public enforcement
agents can more effectively incentivize firms to implement effective ethics and compliance programs, it seems most appropriate for the former category to be considered when
determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat offender. There are likely other proposals for reform that would
be better suited to address repeated instances of misconduct
for firms that have engaged in the latter types of wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The government has dedicated a great deal of time, effort,
money, and energy to incentivizing private firms to implement
effective ethics and compliance programs. This Article makes
three contributions to the academic discourse on organizational compliance efforts. First, the Article, through a case
study, demonstrates that governmental enforcement agents
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are largely ignoring corporate recidivism. Second, the Article
explains that the lack of focus by governmental agents on corporate recidivism appears to be based, at least in part, on interand intra-agency coordination challenges. Third, the Article
argues that efforts to provide incentives aimed at improving
corporate compliance would benefit from mechanisms that
(i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) more aggressively
sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. By employing a
more coordinated enforcement strategy that identifies an institution that is suffering from a systemic compliance failure and
holds corporations responsible for being repeat offenders
across diverse regulatory areas, federal regulators can encourage private firms to implement comprehensive reforms to
their compliance policies and procedures. This could ultimately lead to improved ethical conduct and more effective
ethics and compliance programs within public companies.
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The press releases for each enforcement action may be found on the DOJ Fraud website. See FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions,
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/93DF-T49H] (providing links to
each press release alphabetized by company).
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1
1 2004 InVision Technologies, Inc.
1
0 2004 General Electric
1
1 2004 ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.
1
0 2004 ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd. (later named Vetco Gray UK Ltd.)

2017]

Each Enforcement Action Brought – 159 total
Actions Brought Against Related Corporate Entities – 94 total

APPENDIX A
DOJ FRAUD FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST CORPORATIONS FROM 2004 – 2016217
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Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
1 2007 Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited
1
0 2007 Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA
1
0 2007 Thermo King Ireland Limited
1
1 2007 York International Corporation
1
0 2007 Paradigm B.V.
1
1 2007 Textron Inc.
1
0 2007 David Brown Transmissions France S.A.
1
0 2007 David Brown France Engrenage S.A.S.
1
0 2007 David Brown Guinard Pumps S.A.S.
1
1 2007 Omega Advisors, Inc.
1
1 2007 Baker Hughes Services International, Inc.
1
0 2007 Baker Hughes Incorporated
1
1 2007 Vetco Gray Controls Inc.
1
0 2007 Vetco International Limited
1
0 2007 Vetco Gray Controls Limited
1
0 2007 Vetco Gray UK Limited
1
0 2007 Aibel Group Limited
1
1 2008 AGA Medical Corporation
1
1 2008 Volvo Construction Equipment, AB (VCE)
1
0 2008 Renault Trucks SAS
1
0 2008 Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)
1
1 2008 Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation
1
1 2008 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG)
1
0 2008 Siemens S.A. (Argentina)
Parent (if applicable)
NA
Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited
Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited
NA
NA
NA
Textron Inc.
Textron Inc.
Textron Inc.
NA
Baker Hughes Incorporated
NA
Vetco International Ltd.
NA
Vetco International Ltd.
Vetco International Ltd.
Vetco International Ltd.
NA
Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)
Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)
NA
NA
NA
Siemens AG

Enf. Action
Type
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
NPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
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unknown
Seq: 58

CORNELL LAW REVIEW
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Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
0 2008 Siemens Bangladesh Limited
1
0 2008 Siemens S.A. (Venezuela)
1
1 2008 Willbros Group Inc.
1
1 2008 Willbros International
1
0 2008 Faro Technologies, Inc.
1
1 2008 Fiat S.p.A.
1
0 2008 CNH France S.A.
1
0 2008 Iveco S.p.A.
1
0 2008 CNH Italia S.p.A.
1
1 2008 Flowserve Pompes Sas
1
1 2008 Nexus Technologies, Inc.
1
1 2009 UTStarcom Inc.
1
1 2009 AGCO Corp.
1
0 2009 AGCO Limited
1
0 2009 AGCO Denmark A/S
1
0 2009 AGCO S.A.
1
1 2009 Helmerich & Payne, Inc.
1
1 2009 Control Components, Inc.
1
1 2009 Novo Nordisk A/S
1
1 2009 Latin Node, Inc.
1
1 2009 Kellogg Brown & Root LLC
1
1 2010 Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
1
0 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G.
1
0 2010 Alcatel Centroamerica S.A.
Parent (if applicable)
Siemens AG
Siemens AG
NA
Willbros Group, Inc.
NA
NA
Fiat S.p.A.
Fiat S.p.A.
Fiat S.p.A.
Flowserve Corporation
NA
NA
NA
AGCO Corp.
AGCO Corp.
AGCO Corp.
NA
NA
NA
eLandia International Inc.
KBR Inc.
NA
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
DPA
NPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
NPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
NPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Pleas
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
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unknown
Seq: 59
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
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Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
0 2010 Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A.
1
1 2010 RAE Systems Inc.
1
1 2010 Panalpina World Transport
1
0 2010 Panalpina, Inc.
1
1 2010 Noble Corporation
1
0 2010 Noble Drilling (Nigeria) Ltd.
1
0 2010 Noble Drilling Services Inc.
1
0 2010 Noble International Limited
1
1 2010 Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co. Ltd.
1
1 2010 Pride International, Inc.
1
0 2010 Pride Forasol S.A.S.
1
1 2010 Tidewater Marine International, Inc.
1
0 2010 Tidewater Inc.
1
1 2010 Transocean Inc.
1
0 2010 Transocean Ltd.
1
1 2010 ABB Inc.
1
0 2010 ABB Ltd.
1
1 2010 Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC
1
0 2010 Alliance One International AG
1
0 2010 Alliance One International Inc.
1
1 2010 Universal Corporation
1
0 2010 Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda.
1
1 2010 Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V.
1
0 2010 Saipem S.p.A.
Parent (if applicable)
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
NA
NA
Panalpina World Transport
NA
Noble Corp.
Noble Corp.
Noble Corp.
Royal Dutch Shell plc
NA
Pride International
Tidewater Inc.
NA
Transocean Ltd.
NA
ABB Ltd.
NA
Alliance One International Inc.
Alliance One International Inc.
NA
NA
Universal Corporation
ENI S.p.A
ENI S.p.A

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
NPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
NPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
DPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
NPA
NPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
DPA
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unknown
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Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
0 2010 ENI S.p.A.
1
1 2010 Technip S.A.
1
1 2010 Daimler AG
1
0 2010 DaimlerChrysler China Ltd.
DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (DCAR) (Now Mercedes 1
0 2010 Benz Russia SAO)
1
0 2010 Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH (ETF)
1
1 2010 Innospec Inc.
1
1 2010 BAE Systems plc
1
1 2011 Bridgestone Corporation
1
1 2011 Armor Holdings, Inc.
1
1 2011 Tenaris S.A.
1
1 2011 Johnson and Johnson (DePuy)
1
1 2011 Comverse Technology, Inc.
1
0 2011 Comverse, Inc.
1
0 2011 Comverse, Ltd.
1
1 2011 JGC Corporation
1
1 2011 Tyson Foods, Inc.
1
1 2011 Maxwell Technologies, Inc.
1
1 2011 Aon Corporation
1
1 2011 Magyar Telekom
1
0 2011 Deutsche Telekom AG
1
1 2012 Tyco International, Ltd.
1
0 2012 Tyco Valves and Controls Middle East, Inc.

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
NPA
NPA
DPA
NPA
NPA
NPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
NPA
DPA
NPA
NPA
Guilty

Daimler AG
Daimler AG
NA
NA
NA
BAE Systems Inc.
NA
NA
NA
Comverse Technology, Inc.
Comverse Technology, Inc.
NA
NA
NA
NA
Deutsche Telekom
NA
NA
Tyco Int'l Ltd.

unknown
Seq: 61
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
Plea

2017]
Plea
Plea
Plea
Plea
Plea

Enf. Action
Type
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA

Parent (if applicable)
NA
NA
NA
Daimler AG
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0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd.
Bilfinger SE
Weatherford International Ltd.
Weatherford Services, Ltd.
Diebold, Inc.
Total, S.A.
Ralph Lauren Corporation
Parker Drilling Company
Alstom S.A.
Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom)
Alstom Power Inc.
Alstom Grid Inc.
Avon Products, Inc.

Parent (if applicable)
Pfizer Inc.
NA
NA
NA
NA
Lufthansa Technik AG
NA
Smith & Nephew plc
NA
NA
Archer Daniels Midland
Company
NA
NA
Weatherford International Ltd.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Alstom
Alstom
Alstom
NA

Guilty
DPA
DPA
Guilty
DPA
DPA
NPA
DPA
Guilty
Guilty
DPA
DPA
DPA

unknown
Seq: 62

CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Plea
Plea

Plea

Plea

Enf. Action
Type
DPA
NPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
DPA
NPA
DPA
DPA
NPA

1064

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
1 2012 Pfizer H.C.P. Corporation
1
1 2012 The NORDAM Group, Inc.
1
1 2012 Orthofix International, N.V.
1
1 2012 Data Systems & Solutions LLC
1
1 2012 Biomet, Inc.
1
1 2012 Bizjet International Sales and Support, Inc.
1
0 2012 Lufthansa Technik AG
1
1 2012 Smith & Nephew, Inc.
1
1 2012 Marubeni Corporation
1
1 2013 Archer Daniels Midland Company
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0
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1

0 2016 Oz Africa Management GP

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016

Olympus Latin America Inc.
Olympus Corp. of the Americas
Vimpelcom Ltd.
Unitel LLC
Parametric Technology (Shanghai) Software Company Ltd.
Parametric Technology (Hong Kong) Ltd.
BK Medical ApS
LATAM AIRLINES GROUP S.A.
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group

Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.
Marubeni Corporation
Alcoa World Alumina LLC
Louis Berger International Inc.
IAP Worldwide Services, Inc.

0 2014 Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.

1

2014
2014
2014
2015
2015

1 2014 ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.

Parent (if applicable)
Avon Products, Inc.
NA
NA
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
NA
Alcoa Inc.
NA
NA
Olympus Corp. of the Americas
(OCA)
NA
NA
VimpelCom Ltd.
PTC Inc.
PTC Inc.
Analogic Corporation
NA
NA
Och-Ziff Capital Management
Group

unknown
Seq: 63
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES
Guilty Plea

DPA
DPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
NPA
NPA
NPA
DPA
DPA

NPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
NPA

DPA

Gulty Plea

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
DPA
NPA

2017]

1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
0 2014 Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.
1
1 2014 Dallas Airmotive
1
1 2014 Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.
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159

94

Total

1 2016 Teva LLC (Teva Russia)
0 2016 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
1 2016 General Cable Corporation

Parent (if applicable)
NA
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
NA
Odebrecht S.A.
NA
Teva Pharmaceutrical Industries
Ltd.
NA
NA

Guilty Plea
DPA
NPA

Enf. Action
Type
DPA
NPA
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea

1066

1
1
1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Action Ent.
Year Company
1
1 2016 Embraer S.A.
1
1 2016 JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited
1
1 2016 Rolls-Royce PLC
1
1 2016 Braskem S.A.
1
0 2016 Odebrecht S.A.
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1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1

2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008

DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.
Titan Corporation
SSI International Far East, Ltd.
Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.
Baker Hughes Services International, Inc.
Baker Hughes Incorporated
Vetco Gray Controls Inc.
Vetco International Limited
Vetco Gray Controls Limited
Vetco Gray UK Limited
Aibel Group Limited
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG)
Siemens S.A. (Argentina)

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
DPA
Guilty
DPA
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
DPA
Guilty
Guilty

Plea
Plea

Plea
Plea
Plea
Plea

Plea

Plea
Plea
Plea

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea

Seq: 65
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

The press releases for each guilty plea may be found on the DOJ Fraud website. See id.

1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

Parent (if applicable)
ABB Ltd.
ABB Ltd.
Diagnostic Products
Corporation (DPC)
NA
Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.
NA
Baker Hughes Incorporated
NA
Vetco International Ltd.
NA
Vetco International Ltd.
Vetco International Ltd.
Vetco International Ltd.
NA
Siemens AG

unknown

218

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Guilty
Action Ent.
Plea
Year Company
1
1
1 2004 ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.
1
0
1 2004 ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd. (later named Vetco Gray UK Ltd.)

2017]

Guilty Pleas Obtained – 46 total
Guilty Pleas Obtained Against Corporate Entities – 33 total

APPENDIX B
DOJ FRAUD FCPA GUILTY PLEAS OBTAINED FROM CORPORATIONS FROM 2004 – 2016218
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Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Guilty
Action Ent.
Plea
Year Company
1
0
1 2008 Siemens Bangladesh Limited
1
0
1 2008 Siemens S.A. (Venezuela)
1
1
1 2008 Nexus Technologies, Inc.
1
1
1 2009 Control Components, Inc.
1
1
1 2009 Latin Node, Inc.
1
1
1 2009 Kellogg Brown & Root LLC
1
1
0 2010 Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
1
0
1 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G.
1
0
1 2010 Alcatel Centroamerica S.A.
1
0
1 2010 Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A.
1
1
0 2010 Panalpina World Transport
1
0
1 2010 Panalpina, Inc.
1
1
0 2010 Pride International, Inc.
1
0
1 2010 Pride Forasol S.A.S.
1
1
1 2010 ABB Inc.
1
0
0 2010 ABB Ltd.
1
1
1 2010 Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC
1
0
1 2010 Alliance One International AG
1
0
0 2010 Alliance One International Inc.
1
1
0 2010 Universal Corporation
1
0
1 2010 Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda.
1
1
0 2010 Daimler AG
1
0
0 2010 DaimlerChrysler China Ltd.
Parent (if applicable)
Siemens AG
Siemens AG
NA
NA
eLandia International Inc.
KBR Inc.
NA
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.
NA
Panalpina World Transport
NA
Pride International
ABB Ltd.
NA
Alliance One International Inc.
Alliance One International Inc.
NA
NA
Universal Corporation
NA
Daimler AG

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
NPA
NPA
Guilty Plea
DPA
DPA
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unknown
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0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0

1

0

0

1

1

1

2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014

Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd.
Weatherford International Ltd.
Weatherford Services, Ltd.
Alstom S.A.
Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom)
Alstom Power Inc.
Alstom Grid Inc.
Avon Products, Inc.
Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.

23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

0 2014 Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.

Seq: 67

0 2014 Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.

unknown

1 2014 ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.

1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

Enf. Action
Type

Daimler AG
Guilty Plea
Daimler AG
Guilty Plea
NA
Guilty Plea
NA
Guilty Plea
NA
Guilty Plea
NA
NPA
Tyco Int'l Ltd.
Guilty Plea
NA
NPA
Archer Daniels Midland
Company
Guilty Plea
NA
DPA
Weatherford International
Guilty Plea
NA
Guilty Plea
Alstom S.A.
Guilty Plea
Alstom S.A.
DPA
Alstom S.A.
DPA
NA
DPA
Avon Products, Inc.
Guilty Plea
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
Gulty Plea
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
DPA
Hewlett-Packard Company (HP
Co.)
NPA

Parent (if applicable)

2017]

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Guilty
Action Ent.
Plea
Year Company
DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (DCAR) (Now
1
0
1 2010 Mercedes -Benz Russia SAO)
1
0
1 2010 Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH (ETF)
1
1
1 2010 Innospec Inc.
1
1
1 2010 BAE Systems plc
1
1
1 2011 Bridgestone Corporation
1
1
0 2012 Tyco International, Ltd.
1
0
1 2012 Tyco Valves and Controls Middle East, Inc.
1
1
0 2013 Archer Daniels Midland Company
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0
1
0

1

33

1

67

46

Total

1 2016 Teva LLC (Teva Russia)

1 2016 Oz Africa Management GP
1 2016 Braskem S.A.
1 2016 Odebrecht S.A.

Parent (if applicable)
NA
Alcoa Inc.
NA
VimpelCom Ltd.
NA
Och-Ziff Capital Management
Group
Odebrecht S.A.
NA
Teva Pharmaceutrical
Industries Ltd.

Guilty Plea

Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea

Enf. Action
Type
Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
DPA
Guilty Plea
DPA

1070

1
1
1

Each. Related
Enf.
Corp.
Guilty
Action Ent.
Plea
Year Company
1
1
1 2014 Marubeni Corporation
1
1
1 2014 Alcoa World Alumina LLC
1
1
0 2016 Vimpelcom Ltd.
1
0
1 2016 Unitel LLC
1
1
0 2016 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group
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Parent: ABB
Ltd.
Other Related
Entities: ABB
1 Vetco Gray, Inc.;
ABB Vetco Gray
(UK) Ltd. (later
named Vetco
Gray UK Ltd.)

Company

2: Similar
behavior,
dissimilar
purpose

Repeat
Offender
Category

2007, FCPA,
DOJ

2004, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2001,
Antitrust, DOJ

No - credited
for voluntary
disclosure,
violation
unknown to
government
Yes - 2004
settlement
noted in plea
agreement; did
not receive
minimum fine
in 2007

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

Yes - Vetco
Gray Controls,
Inc., Vetco
Gray Controls,
Ltd. and Vetco
Gray UK Ltd. by the time
settlement
reached no
longer
subsidiaries of
ABB

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Yes - ABB
Middle East &
Africa
Participations
AG
Yes - ABB
Vetco Gray,
Inc. and ABB
Vetco Gray UK
Ltd.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Vetco International Ltd. Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay $26 Million in Criminal Fines
(Feb. 6, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/February/07_crm_075.html
[https://perma.cc/4RU9-N39T].

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Subsidiary
Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging on USAID Construction Contract in Egypt (Apr. 12,
2001),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2001/7984.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9R48-DPPD].
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray
UK Ltd. Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges (Jul. 6, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_465.htm
[https://perma.cc/AD38-VV8Z].

Citation

2017]

#

FCPA Case Study:
Repeat Offenders Data Set

APPENDIX C

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt
unknown
Seq: 69
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

14:02

1071

Company

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2010, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

Violation
Committed by
Citation
Subsidiary?
Yes – “The
Yes - ABB, Inc. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve
organization or
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay $19 Million in Criminal
separately
Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abb-ltd-and-twomanaged line
subsidiaries-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-will-pay
of business
[https://perma.cc/SJ6X-NB39].
committed a
Plea Agreement at 11, United States v. ABB, Inc., No. H-10-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
part of the
29, 2010), ECF No. 12.
instant offense
less than five
years after a
criminal
adjudication
based on
similar
misconduct,”
but only given
minimum
calculated
fine.
Treated as
Recidivist?

unknown

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

1072

Parent:
Diagnostic
Products
Corporation
2
(DPC)
Other Related
Entities: DPC
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd.
Parent: Titan
Corp.
3
Other Related
Entities: NA

#
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3: Unrelated
behavior and
purpose

Parent: Baker
Hughes Inc.
Other Related
5 Entities: Baker
Hughes Services
International,
Inc.

Repeat
Offender
Category

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Company

SEC Press
release
describes the
FCPA violation
as a violation
of a 2001 SEC
cease and
desist order
prohibiting
violations of
the books and
records and
internal
controls
provisions of
the FCPA.
No

Treated as
Recidivist?

2010,
Antitrust, DOJ
2016, Antitrust TBD - only
(only a
complaint
complaint
filed), DOJ

2007, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

Final Judgment, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00659
(D.D.C. July 26, 2010), ECF No. 9-2.
Complaint, United States v. Halliburton Co., No. 1:16-CV-00233 (D. Del. Apr. 6,
2016), ECF No. 1.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to
Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of
Largest Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html
[https://perma.cc/2T36-3Y3Z].

Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Baker Hughes with
Foreign Bribery and with Violating 2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order
(Apr. 26, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm
[https://perma.cc/JP4V-GVC4].

Citation

unknown

No

No

Yes - Baker
Hughes
Services
International
(BHSI)

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?

2017]

Parent:
Schnitzer Steel
Industries, Inc.
4 Other Related
Entities: SSI
International Far
East, Ltd.

#

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt
Seq: 71
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

14:02

1073

Treated as
Recidivist?

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Citation

Seq: 72

Parent: eLandia
International Inc.
0: No Repeat
10 Other Related
Offenses
Entities: Latin
Node, Inc.

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

unknown

9

8

Parent: Vetco
International
Ltd.
Other Related
Entities: Vetco
Gray Controls
Inc.; Vetco Gray
Controls Limited;
Vetco Gray UK
Limited; Aibel
Group Limited
Parent: Siemens
AG
Other Related
Entities:
Siemens S.A.
(Argentina);
Siemens
Bangladesh
Limited; Siemens
S.A. (Venezuela)
Parent: Nexus
Technologies,
Inc.
Other Related
Entities: NA
Parent: Control
Components,
Inc.
Other Related
Entities: NA

Company

1074

7

6

#
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Company

3: Unrelated
behavior and
purpose
(outcome of
pending
litigation
could change
classification)

Repeat
Offender
Category

N/A

TBD –
remanded to
Fourth Circuit

See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct.
1970 (2015).

In re KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1,
2015).

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Government Sues Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services Inc. and Two Foreign Companies for Kickbacks and
False Claims Relating to Iraq Support Services Contract (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-government-sues-kelloggbrown-root-services-inc-and-two-foreign-companies [https://perma.cc/CX73L29H].

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Sues Kellogg, Brown & Root for
Alleged False Claims Act Violations Over Improper Costs for Private Security in
Iraq (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-sues-kellogg-brownroot-alleged-false-claims-act-violations-over-improper-costs-private
[https://perma.cc/AK33-K5QC].

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11,
2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guiltyforeign-bribery-charges-and-agrees-pay-402-million [https://perma.cc/VD2B75EF].

Citation

unknown

2015, False
Claims
Litigation

No

2015, Dodd
No
Frank
Whistleblower
Provision/AntiKickback Act,
SEC

Parent and
thirty-three
subcontractors

No

No

2010, False
Claims Act,
DOJ

Yes - Kellogg
Brown & Root
LLC

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?

2014, False
No
Claims Act,
Anti-Kickbacks
Act, DOJ

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

2009, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

2017]

Parent: KBR
Inc.
Other Related
11
Entities:
Kellogg Brown &
Root LLC

#
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3: Unrelated
behavior and
purpose

Parent:
Panalpina World
Transport;
13
Other Related
Entities:
Panalpina, Inc.

Repeat
Offender
Category

3: Unrelated
behavior and
purpose

Company

Parent: AlcatelLucent, S.A.
Other Related
Entities:
Alcatel-Lucent
Trade
12
International
A.G.; Alcatel
Centroamerica
S.A.; AlcatelLucent France,
S.A.

#

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

No

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay
More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-services-companies-and-freightforwarding-company-agree-resolve-foreign-bribery [https://perma.cc/EM9KG6TB].
Yes - Panalpina Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Freight Forwarder Panalpina Pays U.S.
Inc.
$375,000 to Settle False Claims and Kickbacks Allegations (July 30, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/freight-forwarder-panalpina-pays-us-375000settle-false-claims-and-kickbacks-allegations [https://perma.cc/B9S8-9ECG].
No
Plea Agreement, United States v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., No.
1:10-CR-00270-RJL (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2011), ECF. No. 9.

Panalpina Inc.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, OFAC Civil Penalties Enforcement
Information for May 6, 2005 (May 6, 2005),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Documents/05062005.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3HD-NPGR].

Seq: 74

No

No discussion
of OFAC
penalties

Panalpina Inc.

Violation
Committed by
Citation
Subsidiary?
Yes - Lucent
Lucent Technologies Inc. Agrees to Pay $1 Million Fine to Resolve FCPA
Technologies
Allegations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 21, 2007),
Inc.
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1028.html
[https://perma.cc/GT3B-MCN7].
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Yes - AlcatelLucent France Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation
(Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-sa-and-threeS.A., AlcatelLucent Trade
subsidiaries-agree-pay-92-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt
[https://perma.cc/RM7T-NSU8].
International
A.G., and
Alcatel
Centroamerica
S.A.
Yes - Lucent
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent Subsidiary Agrees to Pay
Technologies
U.S. $4.2 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 21, 2012),
World Services http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-subsidiary-agrees-pay-us-42Inc.
million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations [https://perma.cc/DQ5K-8EDV].

unknown

2010, False
Claims &
Anti-Kickback
Act, DOJ
2011,
Antitrust, DOJ

2005, OFAC
Civil Penalties
Enforcement,
Treasury
Department
2010, FCPA,
DOJ

No settlement
agreement not
available
online
No

No

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

1076

2012, False
Claims Act,
DOJ

2010, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2007, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC
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0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

See #1 above

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category
Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
Treated as
Recidivist?

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Citation

unknown

17

16

15

Parent: Pride
International,
Inc.
Other Related
Entities: Pride
Forasol S.A.S.
Parent: ABB
Ltd.;
Other Related
Entities: ABB
Inc.
Parent: Alliance
One
International
Inc.;
Other Related
Entities:
Alliance One
Tobacco Osh,
LLC; Alliance
One
International AG
Parent:
Universal
Corporation
Other Related
Entities:
Universal Leaf
Tabacos Ltda.

Company

2017]

14

#

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt
Seq: 75
23-MAY-17

COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

14:02

1077

Company

Yes - Armor
Holdings

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

No

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-orderedpay-400-million-criminal-fine [https://perma.cc/P4U9-YTLA].
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, BAE Systems plc Enters Civil Settlement of
Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of $79
Million (May 17, 2011),
https://www.foley.com/files/BAES_StateDeptRelease18may11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G82X-W8UN].
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Armor Holdings Agrees to Pay $10.2 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (July
13, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/armor-holdings-agrees-pay-102million-criminal-penalty-resolve-violations-foreign-corrupt
[https://perma.cc/MB6C-7RUW].

Citation

Seq: 76

2011, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

No

No

2011, ITAR &
AECA, State
3: Unrelated
Dep't
behavior and
purpose

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

No

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

2010, FCPA ,
DOJ, SEC

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

1078

unknown

Parent: BAE
Systems plc
20
Other Related
Entities: NA

Parent: Daimler
AG
Other Related
Entities:
DaimlerChrysler
China Ltd.;
DaimlerChrysler
Automotive
18
Russia SAO
(DCAR) (Now
Mercedes-Benz
Russia SAO);
Daimler Export
and Trade
Finance GmbH
(ETF)
Parent:
Innospec Inc.
19
Other Related
Entities: NA

#
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Company

2: Similar
behavior,
dissimilar
purpose

Repeat
Offender
Category

Yes Bridgestone
Industrial
Products of
America, Inc.
(parent
company also
involved)

No

No

2015, False
Claims &
Truth-inNegotiations
Act, DOJ
2011, FCPA &
Antitrust, DOJ

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign
Government Officials (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corporation-agrees-plead-guiltyparticipating-conspiracies-rig-bids-and-bribe-0 [https://perma.cc/9ZS8-VUQV].

Complaint, United States v. BAE Sys. Tactical Vehicle Sys., LP, No. 2:15-cv12225 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015), ECF No. 1.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Defense Contractors Settle Alleged
Violation of the False Claims Act for $5.5 Million (Sept. 16, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/defense-contractors-settle-allegedviolation-false-claims-act-55-million [https://perma.cc/3ZUQ-G2MW].

Yes - BAE
Systems, Inc.
and BAE
Systems
Tactical Vehicle
Systems LP
Yes - BAE
Systems
Tactical Vehicle
Systems LP

Could not
locate
agreement

2014, False
Claims, DOJ

Citation
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement
with Virginia-Based BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc. (Dec. 28, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlementvirginia-based-bae-systems-ship-repair-inc [https://perma.cc/756D-RUWL].

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Yes - BAE
Systems Ship
Repair Inc., on
behalf of BAE
Systems Ship
Repair Inc.'s
subsidiary BAE
Systems
Southeast
Shipyards
Alabama LLC

Treated as
Recidivist?

2011,
Could not
Discrimination, locate
DOJ
agreement

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

2017]

unknown

Parent:
Bridgestone
21 Corporation
Other Related
Entities: NA

#
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Company

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2014,
Antitrust, DOJ
Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Yes - called
Yes repeat
Bridgestone
offender, Press Industrial
Release states Products of
repeated
America, Inc.
antitrust
(parent
violations a
company also
factor in
involved)
calculating
2014 fine
Treated as
Recidivist?

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to
Price Fixing on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corp-agrees-plead-guilty-pricefixing-automobile-parts-installed-us-cars [https://perma.cc/E9A3-UH5B].

Citation

unknown
Seq: 78

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

1080

Parent: Tyco
International,
Ltd.
Other Related
22
Entities: Tyco
Valves and
Controls Middle
East, Inc.
Parent: Archer
Daniels Midland
Company
Other Related
23
Entities: Alfred
C. Toepfer
International
(Ukraine) Ltd.
Parent:
Weatherford
International
24 Other Related
Entities:
Weatherford
Services, Ltd.

#
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Company

Repeat
Offender
Category

Parent: HewlettPackard
Company
Other Related
1: Similar
Entities: ZAO
Hewlett-Packard behavior and 2010, False
27
similar
A.O.; HewlettClaims, DOJ
purpose
Packard Polska,
SP. Z O.O.;
Hewlett-Packard
Mexico, S. de
2014, False
R.L. de C.V.
Claims, DOJ

2007,
Misleading
Disclosures,
SEC
2010, E-Rate
Fraud, FCC,
DOJ

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

No

No settlement
agreement not
available
online
No settlement
agreement not
available
online

Seq: 79

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Company Agrees to Pay
$32.5 Million for Alleged Overbilling of the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-company-agrees-pay-325million-alleged-overbilling-us-postal-service [https://perma.cc/A6L3-6RTM].

Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns. Comm’n, HP to Pay $16.25 Million to Settle
DOJ-FCC E-Rate Fraud Investigation (Nov. 10, 2010),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-302764A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F749-5Z9P].
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Agrees to Pay the United
States $55 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraud (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-agrees-pay-united-states-55million-settle-allegations-fraud [https://perma.cc/5PAP-7T9E].

In re Hewlett-Packard Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55801, 2007 WL 1515118
(May 23, 2007).

Citation

unknown

No

No

No

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?

No

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

2017]

Parent: Alstom
S.A.
Other Related
Entities: Alstom
Network Schweiz 0: No Repeat
25
Offenses
AG (formerly
Alstom Prom);
Alstom Power
Inc.; Alstom Grid
Inc.
Parent: Avon
Products, Inc.
Other Related
0: No Repeat
26
Entities: Avon
Offenses
Products (China)
Co. Ltd.

#
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Company

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2014, FCPA,
DOJ, SEC

2012, FCPA,
1: Similar
DOJ
behavior and
similar
purpose

Repeat
Offender
Category

No

No

Treated as
Recidivist?

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Yes - HewlettPackard Polska
SP. Z O.O.,
ZAO HewlettPackard A.O.,
HewlettPackard
Mexico, S. de
R.L. de C.V.
No - Joint
Venture with
Kellogg, Brown
& Root LLC

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal
Penalty (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubenicorporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay546 [https://perma.cc/HM8J-ELWQ].

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guiltyforeign-bribery [https://perma.cc/KJD7-FXFW].

Citation

1082

Parent:
Marubeni
28 Corporation
Other Related
Entities: NA

#

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt
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Seq: 80
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Company

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
2014, FCPA,
DOJ

Violation
Committed by
Citation
Subsidiary?
Press Release, FBI, Marubeni Corporation Sentenced for Foreign Bribery
Yes – “The plea No
Violations (May 15, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/fieldagreement
offices/washingtondc/news/press-releases/marubeni-corporation-sentencedcites
for-foreign-bribery-violations [https://perma.cc/UP65-EEYD].
Marubeni's
refusal to
cooperate with
the
department's
investigation
when given the
opportunity to
do so, its lack
of an effective
compliance
and ethics
program at the
time of the
offense, and
its failure to
timely
remediate as
several of the
factors
considered by
the
department in
determining
the
resolution.”
Treated as
Recidivist?

Seq: 81

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

2017]

unknown

Parent: Alcoa
Inc.
Other Related
29
Entities: Alcoa
World Alumina
LLC

#
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1083

Company

Parent:
VimpelCom Ltd.
30 Other Related
Entities: United
LLC
Parent: Och-Ziff
Capital
Management
Group
31
Other Related
Entities: Oz
Africa
Management GP
Parent:
Odebrecht S.A.
32 Other Related
Entities:
Braskem S.A.

#

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)
Treated as
Recidivist?

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?
Citation

1084

0: No Repeat
Offenses

0: No Repeat
Offenses

Repeat
Offender
Category

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-4\CRN403.txt
unknown
Seq: 82

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

23-MAY-17
14:02

[Vol. 102:1003

Company
2013, CAA,
CWA, RCRA,
DOJ, EPA

Year, Legal
Violation, &
Agency(ies)

No

No

Treated as
Recidivist?
Citation

219

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA to Pay $2.25
Million Civil Penalty for Air, Water and Hazardous Waste Violations at Missouri
Facility (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tevapharmaceuticals-usa-pay-225-million-civil-penalty-air-water-and-hazardouswaste [https://perma.cc/9H6C-PY4Y].
Yes (the parent Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company to Pay $27.6
and subsidiary Million to Settle Allegations Involving False Billings to Federal Health Care
(IVAX LLC)
Programs (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceuticalentered into the company-pay-276-million-settle-allegations-involving-false-billings-federal
settlement)
[https://perma.cc/76US-SSYX].
Yes (the parent Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees
and subsidiary to Pay More than $283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Charges
(Teva LLC)
(Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceuticalentered into the industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt
settlement)
[https://perma.cc/NNM4-QDHB].

No

Violation
Committed by
Subsidiary?

unknown

219
At the conclusion of 2016, Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries (Teva) was under investigation for engaging in an antitrust violation that
involved price collusion amongst generic drug makers. See Nathan Vardi, The Man the Feds Are Using to First Crack Open Their Big Antitrust
Case Against Generic Drug Makers, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2016/12/14/the-man-the-feds-areusing-to-first-crack-open-their-big-antitrust-case-against-generic-drug-makers/#3d03fce16124 [https://perma.cc/9FCG-QXHL]. Also note,
Teva acquired Cephalon Inc. in 2012, which had pending charges from the Federal Trade Commission for misconduct in 2008. Teva paid a
$1.2 billion fine for Cephalon’s misconduct in 2015. I have not included this as a repeat offense, because the misconduct occurred well before
Teva acquired the company and was known at the time of acquisition. Teva paid the fine shortly after the acquisition went through. FTC
Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go to Purchasers Affected by
Anticompetitive Tactics, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (May 28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlementcephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill [https://perma.cc/5AHP-UMFA].

2016, FCPA,
DOJ

2014, False
3: Unrelated Claims Act,
behavior and DOJ, HHS
purpose 3

Repeat
Offender
Category

2017]

Parent: Teva
Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.
33 Other Related
Entities: Teva
LLC (Teva
Russia)

#
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